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The Department of Defense’s (DOD) large satellites provide robust capabilities, 
but they are ill designed to combat emerging threats and concerns like anti-satellite 
weapons and a shrinking defense budget. Small satellites are a potential solution to this 
challenge, but the technology is too nascent for the DOD to deploy. This thesis addressed 
the DOD’s need for further research on small satellites by providing a set of decision 
support tools that enables the exploration of small satellite physical trade-offs early in the 
conceptual design phase of the DOD space acquisition process. Early phases of the 
systems engineering process were used to identify DOD small satellite requirements and 
key input factors and output responses that drove meta-model development through  
the use of model-based systems engineering. Microsoft Excel and JMP software were 
employed to build synthesis models used in the decision support tools developed.  
The decision support tools analyzed the relationship between small satellite design inputs 
and outputs to provide trade space insights that can assist DOD space acquisition 
professionals in making better decisions in  the conceptual design phase. More informed 
decision-making in the space acquisition process might preserve valuable DOD resources 
that may have otherwise been wasted. 
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The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on space-based capabilities to maintain 
the advantage in modern warfare. Satellites have been critical force enhancement tools 
for over two decades, and have been particularly important in the mission areas of 
military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) collection. While the DOD’s large satellites provide a robust 
capability, they are ill designed to combat emerging threats and concerns like anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons and the DOD’s gradually shrinking defense budget. If the 
DOD wants to maintain its military advantage, it must seek out innovative solutions to 
protecting its space-based capabilities. One solution is the disaggregation of large 
satellites in favor of constellations of smaller satellites. Unfortunately, small satellites are 
still a relatively new technology whose application needs further exploration before 
deployment, especially by the DOD. This thesis sought to address the DOD’s need for 
further exploration by providing a set of decision support tools that enable the exploration 
of small satellite designs early in the conceptual design phase of the DOD space 
acquisition process. 
This thesis used two techniques to develop the decision support tools, the systems 
engineering process and model-based systems engineering. The systems engineering 
process is a well-known methodology that assists in mapping stakeholder needs and 
requirements to specific functions the system must perform in order to be an effective 
solution. This thesis was concerned with supporting decision making during the early 
conceptual design phase, so it focused on the first two phases, definition of need and 
conceptual design. Completing those phases identified DOD small satellite requirements 
and traced them to key input factors and output responses that informed the initial tool 
built in Microsoft Excel. After identifying the key input factors and output responses, a 
design of experiment (DOE) was applied to produce data that could then be analyzed in 
JMP. The JMP software provided an opportunity to analyze the relationships between the 
input factors and output responses of satellite design both quantitatively and graphically. 
The meta-models derived from the JMP statistical analysis were used to build the 
 xx
synthesis model of DOD small satellites that allowed for exploration of the spacecraft 
design trade space through a trade space analysis worksheet developed in Microsoft 
Excel. The Excel model computes values of specific output responses based on input 
factor values submitted by a user. Those estimated values provided an understanding of 
how changes to input values can also manifest changes in the output responses, thus 
providing an opportunity for exploring different trade-offs in small satellite design. The 
JMP software provided an additional opportunity to graphically explore the trade space of 
a small satellite design through the trade space exploration tool, which was developed by 
this thesis. This trade space exploration tool also provides estimated output response 
values, but then displays them in a graph, allowing the decision maker to visualize the 
amount of margin available to make changes in the feasible design. The resultant insights 
can assist DOD space acquisition professionals in early conceptual design of a small 
satellite to make better decisions. 
With the analysis and information provided by the decision support tools, DOD 
decision makers now have an opportunity to conduct quick feasibility assessments on 
proposed small satellite designs very earlier in the conceptual design phase rather than 
discovering problems later in the process. By receiving the feasibility analysis earlier, 
decision makers may have an opportunity to more effectively apply resources to small 
satellite programs that meet mission requirements. Additionally, the decision support 
tools can be used in conjunction with a utility assessment method. In the case of equally 
feasible designs, the two decision support tools can provide a means for space system 
design adjustments during utility analysis. In the long run, more informed decision-
making in the space acquisition process might preserve valuable DOD resources that 
would have otherwise been wasted. This thesis was a proof of concept that sets a 
foundation for future work. With additional analysis and expansion of the scope and 
focus, the products of this thesis can be enhanced and possibly one day operationally 
deployed to the benefit of the DOD. 
 xxi
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A key area of concern regarding modern and future asymmetric warfare is the 
adversary’s growing desire and capability to diminish and degrade the United States’ 
space capabilities. Satellites have been force-enhancing tools for the U.S. military for 
decades, but threats have emerged that force the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
reconsider the future of its space-based capabilities. This chapter introduces the problem 
with the DOD’s current fleet of large satellites. Also discussed are the research questions 
that drove this thesis, the contributions provided by the work, a short discussion of the 
methodology and scope of the work, and finally a description of the rest of the thesis 
chapters. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
U.S. forces increasingly depend on space systems to provide and/or enhance 
command and control (C2), communications, and intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for warfighters in every domain. While the satellites in 
use by the DOD are highly capable, these satellites cost hundreds of millions of dollars to 
develop and require several years to design and build, due in large part to their massive 
size (i.e., a mass of several thousand kilograms). As a result, only a few satellites are 
made for each program. For example, it is not uncommon for DOD constellations to have 
just three to six satellites. China and Russia are well aware of the military advantage 
gained by space-based capabilities, and in a potential conflict with the United States, they 
will likely attempt to disable or destroy key U.S. military satellites early using anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons. Adversaries recognize that destroying a few key satellites 
could significantly degrade U.S. military operations, and it would cost the United States 
considerable time and resources not available during a conflict to reconstitute that 
capability. This threat makes it imperative that the DOD seek out new and innovative 
ways to mitigate risk and ensure continued access to space assets while meeting 
increasingly restrictive resource requirements. 
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To accomplish this task effectively, DOD decision makers must be provided with 
more accurate design information earlier in the space acquisitions process. This 
information could better support decision makers to sort through proposed space 
programs and determine which solutions are physically feasible, meet cost and schedule 
needs, and improve combat effectiveness in the face of adversary threats. Decision 
makers need the ability to explore the trade space of emerging space programs to gain 
insight and make educated acquisition decisions focused on operational effectiveness. 
Unfortunately, there is currently no tool available to assist decision makers in assessing a 
design’s physical feasibility or relate operational performance to design trade-offs. 
B. SATELLITE USE IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
Since the first Gulf War in 1990, space-based capabilities have been a crucial 
component in modern warfare. Space-based technology has expanded the reach of 
military operations beyond “over the horizon” (OTH), allowing militaries to sustain a 
global presence. Satellites have also increased the speed of communications and 
information flow, allowing military operations to move much faster than ever before. 
Tactics and commands that previously took hours to days to disseminate and execute now 
take as little as a few minutes or possibly even seconds. Joint Publication (JP) 3–14: 
Space Operations was written to address this emerging war-fighting domain, stating that 
space-based capabilities “have proven to be significant force multipliers when integrated 
into military operations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013, ix). JP 3–14 defines various space 
mission areas, including space force enhancement, which is meant to “increase joint force 
effectiveness by increasing the combat potential of that force” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013, 
xi). Satellite technology is an important tool in the space force enhancement mission area. 
As the last superpower after the Cold War, the United States has taken advantage of 
satellite technology, incorporating its capabilities into all war-fighting domains. Figure 1 
is an operational view (OV-1) chart illustrating how satellites are generally used to 
transmit data throughout the DOD’s information network, including to airborne, sea-
based, and terrestrial platforms. 
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Figure 1.  MILSATCOM OV-1 
 
Source: Ballard, Mark. 2014. “Drone Kill Communications Net Illustrated.” Computer 
Weekly. June 13. http://www.computerweekly.com/cgi-bin/mt-search.cgi?blog_id=102& 
tag=GIG&limit=20. 
As the figure shows, satellites have become an integral part of communications 
and information exchange across different warfare domains in the DOD. Satellites 
provide different capabilities to the DOD, chief among them communications and ISR 
data collection. Military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) allow warfighters 
around the world to communicate with fellow warfighters and strategic leaders. Recent 
technological advances have increased SATCOM throughput and capacity, allowing 
more users to share voice, written, and visual/video information at data rates previously 
achievable only through terrestrial landlines. These let the U.S. military act and react 
faster than adversaries to the changes on the battlefield, providing the United States a 
tactical advantage in war. Likewise, ISR data has been invaluable to strategic and tactical 
operations planning, allowing staffs, decision makers, and warfighters to drastically 
reduce the “fog of war” during operations. ISR data can provide information on adversary 
force positioning and strength, and confirm enemy locations and current state. ISR can 
now be collected and shared more quickly and securely through the use of satellites, 
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gathering information nearly nonstop and reducing the need for riskier forms of 
intelligence gathering (i.e., human intelligence or HUMINT or airborne ISR over denied 
areas). 
C. THREATS TO DOD SATELLITE CAPABILITIES 
For years, the United States has used space to maintain a military advantage, but 
new threats have emerged that could jeopardize this advantage by negating the benefits 
provided by satellites. China has surfaced and Russia has re-emerged as near-peers with 
regard to military space capabilities, competing for the use of space to gain the advantage 
in combat. The recent reintroduction of ASAT weapons and their testing is particularly 
alarming for U.S. space operations. China first revealed its ASAT weapons technology in 
January 2007, when it launched a ground-based ballistic missile into low Earth orbit 
(LEO) to purposely destroy one of its own weather satellites (Gruss 2015). Figure 2 is a 
graphic from The Telegraph, a United Kingdom newspaper, illustrating the process of 
China’s ASAT test in 2007. 
Figure 2.  Chinese ASAT 
 
Source: Spencer, Richard. 2007. “Chinese Missile Destroys Satellite in Space.” The 
Telegraph. January 19. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1539948/Chinese-
missile-destroys-satellite-in-space.html. 
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Additional Chinese ASAT demonstrations include a missile launch in 2013 and a 
“nondestructive missile defense test” in July 2014. Dean Cheng, a senior research fellow 
with the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in Washington, DC, has said that 
China’s ASAT development appears to be ongoing. Cheng’s research also indicates the 
Chinese missile launch in 2013 was testing for an ASAT system meant to target satellites 
in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) (Gruss 2015). While speaking about China’s successful 
ASAT testing in 2014, Lieutenant General John “Jay” Raymond, former commander of 
the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC-Space) and Air Force Space 
Command, commented that “soon every satellite in every orbit will be able to be held at 
risk” (Clark 2015). China’s development, testing, and use of ballistic missiles as ASAT 
weapons is unlikely to cease or slow down in the near future, posing an immediate and 
future threat for U.S. space systems. The United States may be unable to stop China from 
using ASAT weapons, but it can take action to better protect its assets. One potential 
solution is the disaggregation of U.S. constellations composed of few large satellites into 
constellations containing a greater number of smaller satellites. 
Another obstacle DOD space programs must face is the recent reduction in the 
U.S. defense budget, which has declined over the last several years. Based on data from 
the Office of Management and Budget, the U.S. defense budget is estimated to be $601.3 
billion in fiscal year (FY) 2017, a loss of $120 billion from FY 2010’s budget of $721.3 
billion (Spring 2012). The DOD’s current effort to reduce its budget has a negative effect 
on the continued evolution of U.S. military satellite technology. Space programs are 
notoriously expensive, typically costing hundreds of millions of dollars and sometimes 
billions of dollars. Figure 3 shows the decrease from President Barack Obama’s military 
space budget request to the military space budget Congress approved for FY 2014. 
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Figure 3.  Military Space Budget FY14 
 
From Gruss, Mike. 2014. “Budget Bill Hits Military Satellite Programs.” SpaceNews. 
http://spacenews.com/39096budget-bill-hits-military-satellite-programs/. 
The difference between the president’s military space budget request and what 
Congress approved for FY 2014 was a combined loss of approximately $600 million 
(Gruss 2014). The decreased budget is a troubling trend considering the U.S. military’s 
reliance on space and adversary desires to disrupt U.S. capability. At the very least, the 
DOD must seek out solutions for more efficient use of the budget while maintaining its 
current space capabilities. At best, the DOD should look to expand and improve these 
capabilities in order to maintain the tactical advantage. U.S. adversaries are rapidly 
gaining ground in space, and the United States cannot afford to slow the evolution of its 
space systems. 
The use of satellites has become such a crucial component of how the U.S. 
military conducts its operations that degrading this capability could severely diminish the 
strength of the U.S. military. The loss of key space systems would hamper U.S. military 
operations from the highest level down to the tactical systems that rely on satellites, 
potentially disrupting how the warfighter would perform his/her duties. Based on these 
threats, the DOD must consider new innovative solutions to maintain its space superiority 
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while moving away from the traditional large and expensive satellites that take years to 
develop and build. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions were developed based on the background and 
problem statement previously discussed. These research questions drove the work 
completed in this thesis.  
 How can model-based systems engineering (MBSE) develop a 
physical/synthesis model of a small satellite for use in trade space 
analysis? 
 How can a model examine spacecraft design factors with respect to 
impacts on combat effectiveness? 
 What information can we learn from a design model of a small satellite? 
How can that information assist spacecraft designers? 
 Can a tool be developed to assist program acquisition decision makers in 
building a satellite that improves combat effectiveness? 
E. CONTRIBUTION 
The intent of this thesis was not to design a small satellite for the DOD or even 
develop potential alternative solutions. Instead, the intent was to develop a 
physical/synthesis model and tools that could support decision makers. These tools would 
respond to design factors chosen by the user (i.e., physical characteristics, cost) and allow 
the user to explore the trade space. The tools would then supply a graphical trade space 
depicting whether the inputs were physically feasible, and how much margin the user had 
in design factors for additional adjustments and fine-tuning. 
This thesis will use accepted systems engineering (SE) practices, specifically 
focused on model-based systems engineering while attempting to solve the 
aforementioned real-world space problems. It is the author’s hope that the results are 
user-friendly design tools that allow acquisition professionals to trade design factor 
mission requirements and needs, and explore potential alternatives for feasibility using a 
graphical representation of the proposed satellite’s design trade space. The graphical 
trade space function should allow the acquisition professional to 1) assess feasibility in 
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terms of preliminary physical designs, and 2) see how capabilities and programmatic 
considerations, like revisit time and cost, change when various design factors are 
modified within the bounds of the trade space. 
The design tools are intended to be used very early in the satellite design process 
and by a DOD acquisitions professional who has some knowledge and experience with 
space and satellite design, but who is not necessarily the person designing or building the 
satellite (i.e., not the systems or design engineer). The tools will help DOD space 
acquisition professionals identify whether a proposed satellite program can physically 
meet the stated mission requirements. In addition to feasibility, they also provide an early 
estimate of a potential satellite’s preliminary design factors to include mass, size, 
capability, and cost. Knowing and understanding these preliminary factors early in 
conceptual design will provide the acquisition professional a realistic expectation for the 
proposed satellite, which will save both time and costs later in the design and build 
process. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis used a SE methodology to address a space problem. Specifically, the 
work applied the SE process as defined in Systems Engineering and Analysis by 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011). This thesis did not need to consider the entire life cycle 
of a system because it did not involve design of an actual space system. Instead, the work 
is focused on the early steps of the SE process, specifically conceptual design. Like all 
SE processes, steps have been modified to address this thesis’s specific problem. These 
steps included defining the problem, identifying stakeholder requirements and 
requirements analysis, conducting a functional decomposition of the system, and 
developing measures of effectiveness and key factors, which were used to build the 
synthesis model tool. 
G. SCOPE 
In accomplishing the SE tasks to meet the stated contributions, this thesis was 
scoped into four specific areas. First, this thesis focused on the use and design of small 
satellites as opposed to the typical larger satellites the DOD is using almost exclusively 
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today as a solution to disaggregating large satellites. Small satellites provide a potential 
solution to the ASAT threat through disaggregation; a constellation made of many small 
satellites provides many smaller targets, forcing an adversary to expend more ASAT 
resources and/or diminishing the effects of an ASAT weapon on the capability. For this 
thesis, a “small satellite” is defined as any satellite with a mass less than 500 kilograms, 
and includes smaller size categories used by industry professionals such as microsatellites 
(10-100 kilograms) and nanosatellites (1-10 kilograms). While 500 kilograms was the 
defined upper limit for this thesis’s focus, more consideration was given to satellites 
within the microsatellite mass range. That range more closely met the masses and sizes of 
the small satellite designs currently emerging in both the U.S. government and 
commercial sectors. 
Second, only DOD space programs were considered. Focusing on DOD programs 
provided a more realistic understanding of requirements for the thesis because those 
programs have made it through the DOD acquisitions process, rather than considering 
commercial or foreign alternatives that have not been approved for DOD use. This 
includes a literature review of past work investigating the DOD’s potential use of small 
satellites, stakeholder mission needs and requirements for a small satellite, and small 
satellite programs being developed and/or field tested by the DOD. Commercial small 
satellite designs, requirements, and needs were not included unless it was found the DOD 
also required those same considerations. Foreign small satellites also were not considered 
during the thesis work. 
Third, only two space force enhancement components were examined in this 
work: satellite communications (SATCOM) and ISR. While other space components are 
important, the majority of DOD satellites have historically been built to provide force 
enhancement in these two mission areas. This is especially true for the U.S. Navy, which 
is more commonly seen as a space consumer rather than producer or operator. Other 
space force enhancement mission areas such as position, navigation, and timing (PNT) 
have produced satellite programs like the Global Positioning System (GPS), but the 
overwhelming majority of satellite programs reside in the SATCOM and ISR mission 
areas. 
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Last, considering the focus on small satellite design and use, low Earth orbit 
(LEO) was exclusively examined. This thesis will delve into more specific details in later 
chapters, but the focus on LEO is due to the technological limitations of small satellites 
used in SATCOM and ISR, and also DOD satellite requirements (likely for the same 
physics-based reasons). Constellations of small satellites operate more effectively in LEO 
than other orbits, as opposed to large satellites that possess more power and capability 
and thus can operate at higher altitudes. 
H. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into six chapters, with the forthcoming chapters going 
into greater detail regarding the work completed in an effort to solve the problem 
addressed in this chapter. Chapter II is the literature review, outlining the research 
conducted on the DOD’s current catalog of large satellites, emerging space systems 
threats to DOD satellites, and the DOD’s potential use of small satellites as a solution. 
The literature review discusses two specific areas of previous research: the design and 
use of small satellites within the DOD and the use of systems engineering in DOD 
capability design. Chapter III discusses the SE process and methodology used to provide 
the foundation for the model. Application of the SE process is also discussed, as are the 
results of applying that process to this problem, including identification of the primary 
DOD small satellite mission requirements, and defining the key factors based on those 
needs. Chapter IV discusses the development of the decision support tools, including the 
input and output design factors used, the mathematical equations used to produce those 
outputs, using the results of the tools to develop a model, and how the model was used to 
provide a trade space output. Chapter V provides a scenario simulation of how the tools 
may be used by DOD space acquisition professionals to assist in feasibility assessments 
on behalf of operational commands. Chapter VI summarizes this work and provides 
closing thoughts and recommendations for follow-on work. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is important to review the history and work in the field of DOD space-based 
systems in order to provide a foundation for the work and contributions accomplished by 
this thesis. Understanding the DOD’s historical use of space-based systems and 
additional research regarding their design will provide the context from which this thesis 
was established. This chapter discusses the DOD’s current use of satellites, their 
capabilities, their disadvantages, the threat, and how emerging space capabilities can be 
used to mitigate operational risk. This chapter introduces the reader to work that has been 
done in the field of small satellite design, including commercial advances in small 
satellite design and DOD small satellite research and development programs. Also 
discussed are studies and research concerning the DOD space acquisitions process for 
new systems and the historical use of model-based systems engineering in DOD military 
systems design. 
A. SATELLITES IN THE DOD 
The DOD’s current use of satellites predominantly falls into three broad areas: 
SATCOM, ISR, and PNT. SATCOM satellites allow warfighters to communicate with 
each other in-theater and around the globe without relying on ground-based 
telecommunication lines. ISR produces imagery and other products that provide 
information on allied and adversary locations and order of battle. The United States’ 
intelligence community (IC) owns and manages most of the U.S. ISR satellites, though 
the DOD relies heavily on its products for intelligence and operations planning. PNT 
refers to the use of satellites to provide positional information for platforms and 
warfighters and timing to synchronize military systems for coordination. PNT is 
primarily provided by the Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation, which is 
owned by the DOD and managed by the U.S. Air Force (USAF), but this thesis will not 
concentrate on PNT beyond a short discussion. 
The DOD is continuously replacing its older satellite systems with newer, more 
capable, and more robust satellites. Unfortunately, the latest generation of DOD satellites 
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share many similarities with the legacy systems they are replacing and fail to account for 
emerging threats. These similarities include extremely large, complex, and capable 
satellites operating in constellations of a small number of satellites primarily in 
geosynchronous orbit. These factors allow for maximum support and capability to the 
warfighter and global coverage using fewer satellites. While these designs have many 
advantages, they also come with risk. Billions of defense dollars and decades of labor 
make the current generation of DOD satellites critical systems, which are expected to last 
for over a decade. However, the rapidly evolving realm of space technology and the 
emergence of space-capable nations like China put the current generation of DOD 
satellites at risk. 
1. Military SATCOM 
One critical space force enhancement component is military SATCOM 
(MILSATCOM). While early MILSATCOM systems provided the U.S. military the 
advantage of OTH voice and data communications, advances in telecommunication 
technology over the past 15 years has allowed more robust communications. These 
include the transfer of larger data files (i.e., emails, detailed imagery) and live streaming 
video, allowing more operationally essential information to be shared across greater 
distances. The DOD recognized the advantages of different bands within the 
electromagnetic frequency spectrum and divided its MILSATCOM systems into three 
primary categories: narrowband, wideband, and protected. 
a. Narrowband  
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) is the DOD’s next generation 
narrowband tactical SATCOM system, replacing the older Ultra High Frequency (UHF) 
Follow-On (UFO) system to provide UHF band communications to the warfighter. 
MUOS is designed to provide cellphone-like communication services (i.e., voice and 
data) to small receiver terminals and mobile users who may be operating in 
disadvantaged areas (i.e., mountains, jungles, “urban canyons”) at data rates up to 384 
Kbps (Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 2014). The MUOS constellation is 
made of four satellites and a single on-orbit spare spaced in geosynchronous orbit, 
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providing global SATCOM coverage. The MUOS satellites have a dry mass of 3,812 
kilograms (Spaceflight101 2016b). 
b. Wideband 
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) is a DOD wideband SATCOM system, 
which replaced the older Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) to provide 
wideband SATCOM in the Super High Frequency (SHF) band. WGS’s use of SHF 
allows it to provide more secure communication channels (i.e., low probability of 
intercept/detection, jam resistant) than UHF, and higher data rates ranging from 2.1 to 3.6 
Gbps of total capacity (Spaceflight101 2016c). The current on-station WGS constellation 
contains seven satellites in geosynchronous orbit, each with a mass of approximately 
5,987 kilograms (Air Force Space Command 2015b). WGS is viewed by the DOD as the 
“backbone of the U.S. military’s global satellite communications,” providing voice, data, 
video, and other telecommunication services to warfighters on the ground and ships at sea 
(Air Force Space Command 2015b). 
c. Protected 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) is the DOD’s modern protected 
SATCOM system, replacing the older Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) 
system. AEHF operates in the EHF band and provides survivable (i.e., nuclear) and 
protected (i.e., jam-resistant) communications for both strategic and tactical operations 
despite disadvantaged conditions (i.e., nuclear war) (Lockheed Martin 2016b). The 
AEHF constellation is composed of three satellites with an approximate mass of 6,170 
kilograms, though Lockheed Martin is contracted to build a total of six satellites. AEHF 
can support a variety of data rates, ranging from compatibility with MILSTAR’s low data 
rates of 75 bps to 2,400 kbps to higher data rates up to 8.191 Mbps (Spaceflight101 
2016a). 
2. ISR Satellites 
The U.S. military has relied on satellites to collect ISR data since the 1960s when 
the Corona satellite was used to gather photographic imagery of the former Soviet Union 
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(Moltz 2011, 104). Since then, the DOD has expanded the ISR data it requests to include 
weather patterns, geological and terrain data, and intelligence on electronic signals 
emitted from ground and sea-based sensors. Gathering intelligence through space-based 
systems, especially satellite imagery, has become vital to the U.S. intelligence 
community and military operations planning. 
The majority of ISR systems used by the DOD are classified programs, however, 
missile warning satellites offer a similar product to ISR, and conduct somewhat similar 
missions. Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is a missile warning satellite system that 
uses short wave and mid-wave infrared (IR) sensors to conduct surveillance from space 
(Air Force Space Command 2015a). SBIRS’ IR payload makes it a critical system for 
detecting missiles launches and providing early missile warning, missile defense, battle 
space awareness, and technical intelligence gathering. The SBIRS constellation uses four 
systems, two hosted payloads in a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) and two government-
owned satellites in GEO, which are managed and operated by U.S. Air Force personnel. 
The two SBIRS payloads on host satellites have a mass of approximately 245 kilograms, 
less than 10% of the 2,540 kilograms total mass of the GEO satellites (Air Force Space 
Command 2015a). 
3. PNT Satellites 
The DOD’s PNT space force enhancement mission is achieved through the GPS 
constellation. The GPS constellation uses 24 satellites in medium Earth orbit (MEO) 
equally spaced across six different planes to provide PNT services around the world 95% 
of the time (National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and 
Timing 2016). While the GPS constellation is maintained and operated by U.S. Air Force 
personnel, GPS provides precise navigation services to all civilians around the world in 
addition to the U.S. military. GPS satellites have a mass of approximately 3,680 
kilograms (Los Angeles Air Force Base 2014). GPS is the premiere global navigation 
satellite system (GNSS) in the world though space near-peers like Russia and China are 
trying to field their own GNSS satellites, the Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GLONASS) and BeiDou, respectively. 
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4. Disadvantages of Current DOD Satellites 
The most significant disadvantage of U.S. satellites is the number of key satellites 
in the DOD is quantifiably small yet the sizes of the satellites are large, escalating the 
cost of the systems. One of the DOD’s biggest challenges regarding the future of 
satellites is monetary cost and the time needed to develop, build, and launch these large 
satellites. For example, MUOS is one of the newest DOD constellations to be built and 
has taken more than 10 years to develop at a cost of $1.2 billion dollars per satellite as of 
September 2013, as shown in Figure 4 (Sullivan 2014, 97–98). 
Figure 4.  MUOS Program 
 
Source: Sullivan, Michael J. 2014. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs. GAO-14-340SP. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/Press/Documents/MUOS/GAO_ASWP_March2014_M
UOS_S.pdf. 
As the figure shows, the MUOS program has taken 14 years to produce a satellite 
system and is still not projected to reach full capability until January 2017 despite a $1.2 
billion dollar investment by the DOD. While these satellites provide a robust SATCOM 
capability and global coverage using only four satellites, the growth of small satellite 
technology and new trends in disaggregation suggest that a similar capability and effect 
could be had for much cheaper and much more quickly, while avoiding many of the risks 
faced by larger satellites. 
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In addition to cost, another disadvantage of U.S. military satellites is that they are 
vulnerable to ASAT technology developed by potential adversaries. ASAT technology 
can deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, or destroy satellites in a number of ways. Non-
destructive systems can include signal jammers or electro-optical countermeasures while 
more destructive methods include kinetic-energy weapons like guns and fragmented 
warheads, or directed-energy weapons like lasers or particle accelerators (U.S. Congress 
Office of Technology Assessment 1985). These provide adversaries a wide range of 
options for interfering with or destroying U.S. satellite capabilities. However, the U.S. 
military seems most concerned with kinetic kill vehicles (KKV), specifically the direct 
ascent ASAT weapons China is currently producing, due to their ability to completely 
destroy systems and put others at risk. 
Direct ascent ASAT weapons are essentially ballistic missiles launched from 
Earth into space with the purpose of destroying satellites. Despite their destructive 
potential, direct ascent ASAT weapons are still a nascent technology, even for space-
capable nations like China, and thus are a prized resource. As such, an adversary would 
likely seek to use that capability against a high value target at a time when its destruction 
would produce the greatest negative effects. In this case, the operational risk to larger 
satellites is much greater than the risk to small satellites because there are fewer targets 
that an adversary must attack to produce a proportional negative effect. As an example, 
the MUOS constellation is composed of four satellites providing global coverage with 
some overlap between each other. If an adversary deemed MUOS critical to the United 
States’ war fighting capability during a conflict, it is likely they would use one or more 
ASAT weapons to destroy one or more of the MUOS satellites. As seen in Figure 5, the 
loss of one or two MUOS satellites (the satellite over Asia and China, for example) 
results in a gap in UHF SATCOM capability for the warfighters in that operating area. 
Other than the single on-orbit spare, which would still need time to reposition into the 
gap, the UH SATCOM loss is not easily recoverable due to the build and production 




Figure 5.  MUOS Coverage 
 
Source: Oetting, John D., and Tao Jen. 2011. “The Mobile User  
Objective System.” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, 30: 106. 
http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/TD/td3002/Oetting.pdf. 
Even if the adversary has limited counter-space capabilities, it is possible to 
effectively degrade U.S. space capability. However, that effect becomes much more 
difficult for the adversary to achieve as the number of targets (i.e., satellites) increases, as 
would be seen through implementation of the disaggregation concept. By comparison, a 
constellation of dozens of smaller satellites makes the constellation a less desirable target 
for limited high cost weapons systems like ASAT weapons, which would need to destroy 
many satellites to produce the same effect. Thus, the cost for the adversary is increased 
because of U.S. satellite disaggregation. 
In 2014, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study to learn 
more about the feasibility of disaggregating large satellite constellations in favor of 
constellations made of several smaller satellites (Chaplain 2014). The DOD’s reported 
goals for disaggregating large satellites were reducing acquisition monetary cost and 
(operational/program sustainment) risk and improving U.S. space systems’ resiliency 
against increased intentional and unintentional threats. The study listed potential benefits 
of disaggregation, which were 
 Improved affordability and lower life-cycle costs 
 Improved system resilience by spreading the capability across more 
satellites 
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 Increased ability to use commercial products, reduce build response time, 
and prevent systemic failures 
 Increased advantages in the DOD acquisition process through the use of 
innovative business practices and more tailored acquisition 
 Improved industrial base through more stable demand and higher 
production rates distributed over multiple contractors. 
For every potential benefit, the study also listed potential limitations of 
disaggregation, which were 
 Increased costs due to interoperability support, more complex ground 
systems, more satellites required to fulfill a capability, and duplication of 
effort in different programs 
 Decreased system resilience due to increased protection for an increased 
number of ground stations and a more congested space environment 
 Decreased capabilities due to some systems being unable to fit on smaller 
satellites, inability to support more frequent launches, lack of 
interoperability between legacy and new systems, and constraining 
available bandwidth 
 Increased difficulty in the acquisitions process because of more rapid 
requirements development, the need to acquire more satellites, and 
complications in DOD program oversight 
 Disrupted industrial base due to inability to support faster and more 
frequent production and interrupting the traditional providers in the 
current industrial base. 
As shown, disaggregation into constellations of smaller satellites is not without its 
own operational challenges. The DOD’s potential disaggregation of large satellites also 
presents systemic barriers (Chaplain 2014). These include substantial changes to the 
space acquisition culture and process, gaps in delivery of the satellites, the ground 
stations, and the user terminals, which the DOD is still struggling with under the current 
space acquisition process. Additionally, the DOD would need to modify its practice of 
producing stove-piped satellite control networks and potentially incur costs associated 
with either building smaller launch vehicles or using the current launch vehicles that may 
be more capable and expensive than is needed. While the DOD is already pursuing 
research in disaggregation, the study stated it is too early to determine whether or not the 
 19
DOD’s current analysis of alternatives (AOA) can efficiently assess disaggregation 
especially since the DOD lacks a standard assessment methodology to quantify resilience 
that can be used consistently in AOAs. Ultimately, the GAO suggested that the 
disaggregation of satellites was a potential solution to the DOD’s goals of reduced cost 
and risk and improved resiliency, but confirmation would require additional research. 
B. EMERGING DOD SPACE SOLUTIONS 
As evidenced by the 2014 GAO study, the DOD has been looking for other space 
solutions that can minimize the risks associated with larger satellites, but still provide an 
effective capability to the warfighter. Two potential solutions that have emerged in the 
past decade are small satellites and high altitude airships (HAAS). 
1. Small Satellites 
Small satellites have captured the interest of many space professionals and 
enthusiasts over the past decade. Access to space was previously reserved for the 
wealthiest and most capable nations and companies, but advances in materials, circuitry, 
robotics, and information technology at the beginning of the 21st century has drastically 
decreased entry requirements for participation in space. Users outside of national space 
programs can now build satellites and arrange for their launch into space. Thanks to years 
of development, small satellites now provide the academic, commercial, and military 
space sectors a new vehicle to explore and/or use the space environment for their own 
benefit and purposes. The two prime areas of concern for this work are commercial and 
DOD use of small satellites. 
a. Commercial Use of Small Satellites 
As with most technology, the U.S. commercial sector is developing and producing 
new innovative space systems much faster than the U.S. government, primarily because 
companies are not as risk adverse, nor do they suffer from a bloated acquisitions process 
that slows innovation and development. One such innovation is the development of the 
CubeSat, a miniature satellite just 10 centimeters cubed with a mass of only a few 
kilograms (CubeSat Program 2014). These “1U” (one CubeSat unit) CubeSats, as shown 
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in Figure 6, can be combined into larger, modular, more capable satellites, such as “2U” 
(two stacked CubeSat cubes) or “3U” (three stacked CubeSat cubes) designs. The 
CubeSat was a collaborative project between researchers at California State Polytechnic 
University (Cal Poly) and Stanford University who wanted to develop a standardized 
picosatellite design in order to minimize cost and development time. These reasons are 
exactly why CubeSat and other small satellite technology are beneficial to the DOD. As a 
result, the use of CubeSats as a cheaper solution for space systems has spread across the 
academic and commercial world, and has the potential to address many of the emerging 
threats facing U.S. military satellites. 
Figure 6.  CubeSats 
 
Source: CubeSat Program. 2009. “Dnepr 45 Integration.” Last modified November 8. 
http://htp.www.cubesat.org/index.php/media/pictures/48-dnepr-45-integration. 
While the modular CubeSat is a relatively new design concept even in the 
commercial sector, large constellations of smaller satellites are not a new concept. 
Iridium has been successfully providing reliable SATCOM to mobile users in this manner 
for years. Iridium’s constellation is composed of 66 satellites cross-linked across six 
orbital planes in LEO, providing voice and data communications globally (Iridium 2015). 
Iridium’s satellites have a mass of only 698 kilograms, over five times less that the 
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DOD’s MUOS satellite, which serves a similar role (Encyclopedia Astronautica 2016). 
Figure 7 illustrates the Iridium constellation around the globe. 
Figure 7.  Iridium Constellation 
 
Source: Jayne, Bob. 2007. “Effects of Satellite Constellation Deployment on Communication 
Networks.” ASEN 5050 Final Paper. University of Colorado. 
http://ccar.colorado.edu/asen5050/projects/projects_2007/jayne_proj/. 
As shown, the Iridium constellation provides global coverage to users around the 
world thanks to the large number of satellites in orbit. Following in Iridium’s footsteps, 
U.S. companies are advancing the idea of disaggregation and building constellations of 
dozens of smaller satellites. Planet Labs is developing a constellation of over 100 
nanosatellites (nanosats) that will provide worldwide imagery at three to five meter 
resolutions for use in multiple commercial, civil, and military applications (Planet Labs 
2016). This is similar to services being provided by much larger commercial satellites. 
Figure 8 shows a rack of several Planet Labs’ nanosatellites. 
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Figure 8.  Planet Labs Dove Nanosat Design 
 
Source: Werner, Debra. 2013. “Commercial Spaceflight: With 2 More CubeSats in Orbit, 
Earth-imaging Startup Planet Labs Ships Next Batch of 28 to Wallops.” Spacenews, 
November 26. http://spacenews.com/38361commercial-spaceflight-with-2-more-cubesats-in-
orbit-earth-imaging-startup/. 
Planet Labs’ Dove nanosats use a 3U CubeSat design and have a mass of 
approximately five kilograms, which is over 500 times smaller than DigitalGlobe’s much 
larger WorldView-3 satellite (Earth Observation Portal 2016). As depicted in Figure 9, 
WorldView-3 has a mass of approximately 2,800 kilograms, but can provide sub-meter 
resolution. 
Figure 9.  Imaging Satellite Comparison 
 
Source: Butler, Declan. 2014. “Many Eyes on Earth.” Nature, Volume 505, Issue 7482. 
http://www.nature.com/news/many-eyes-on-earth-1.14475. 
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As the figure shows, Dove nanosats are 500 times lighter than WorldView-3 
satellites, but Dove’s resolution capability is only reduced by a factor of 10 (0.3 meters 
versus 3 meters, respectively). While Plant Labs’ Dove satellite and “Flock 1” 
constellation may not be able to achieve the resolution of larger imaging satellites such as 
WorldView-3, it can still provide high-resolution images that may be good enough for 
certain applications, and do so with a significantly smaller satellite and potentially 
cheaper constellation. 
b. DOD Use of Small Satellites 
While the DOD does not currently have any small satellite programs of record, 
some of the DOD’s space commands, such as the U.S. Army’s Space and Missile 
Defense Command (SMDC) and the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR), have already begun research and development on the use of 
small satellites in military operations. This includes several operational test beds in both 
MILSATCOM and ISR. John London, the SMDC program manager for nanosatellite 
development, believes small satellites can fill a void in the DOD’s current satellite 
arsenal. London envisions using nanosats to provide beyond line of sight (BLOS) 
communications and ISR for the tactical warfighter while also maintaining a relatively 
low monetary cost and responding quickly to operational needs (McCoy 2013). 
One such program is the SMDC-Operational Nanosatellite Effect (SMDC-ONE), 
whose primary mission is “to demonstrate voice relay through a low-Earth-orbit satellite 








Figure 10.  SMDC-ONE OV-1 
 
Source: Earth Observation Portal. 2016. “SMDC-ONE (Space & Missile  
Defense Command-Operational Nanosatellite Effect).” February 25. 
https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/s/smdc-one. 
As the OV-1 illustrates, SMDC-ONE is capable of receiving sensor data from 
U.S. military sensors in disadvantaged areas of operation and transmitting them to U.S. 
military operators located in distant forward operating bases (FOB). SMDC-ONE’s 
maiden launch and demonstration occurred in December 2010, during which the satellite 
successfully received data from unattended ground sensors and spacecraft command and 
control (C2) commands from portable ground stations. 
SPAWAR has also developed and tested a similar small satellite for the United 
States Navy, the Integrated Communications Extension Capability (ICE-Cap). ICE-Cap 
is a three-unit (3U) CubeSat planned for launch in 2016, as is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  SPAWAR’s ICE-Cap Display 
 
Source: Connor, Katherine. 2015. “SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific Celebrates   
75 by Talking About Its Research.” The Daily Transcript. June 9. 
http://www.sddt.com/News/article.cfm?SourceCode=20150609czg#.VpKMV3svpKo. 
ICE-Cap’s primary mission is demonstrating communication with users on secure 
networks using the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), a system composed of four 
large satellites spaced out in geosynchronous orbit (Mroczek and Petrie 2015). SPAWAR 
also hopes to demonstrate ICE-Cap’s ability to relay communications from users near the 
North Pole to other users positioned in other operational areas around the world, 
enhancing MUOS’s global coverage to include the poles. 
Another warfare community that has taken recent interest in using small satellites 
is special operations forces (SOF). The interest spawned from the United States Special 
Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) desire to improve the responsiveness of space-
based systems in providing tactical information to SOF operators who can be equipped 
with light and mobile SATCOM ground antennas as shown in Figure 12 (Mattox 2014). 
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Figure 12.  SOF with SATCOM Ground Antenna 
 
Source: Surviving in the city. 2016. “Current trends in special forces of foreign countries.” 
February 25. http://survincity.com/2012/02/current-trends-in-the-special-forces-of-foreign/. 
The first phase of USSOCOM’s effort produced the Perseus CubeSat, a 
technology demonstration to prove CubeSats could be made cheaply and operated easily. 
The Perseus CubeSats were built for $25,000 each. In the fall of 2011, USSOCOM began 
its next phase, producing the Prometheus satellites with the help of the Pentagon’s Office 
of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). The Prometheus satellites are 1.5U CubeSats 
that are designed for a three to five year service life and cost less than $100,000 each. 
Their primary mission was to demonstrate a small satellite’s ability to “transfer audio, 
video, and data files from man-portable, low profile, remotely located field units to 
deployable ground station terminals using over-the-horizon satellite communications.” 
(Mattox 2014) Despite success with Prometheus, USSOCOM has said it does not expect 
Prometheus to replace services provided by current space-based systems. However, 
USSOCOM’s CubeSat R&D efforts show a DOD command’s interest in filling the 
capability gap of a low cost, rapidly deployable, short-term system that could still meet 
the warfighter’s communications and ISR needs. 
The DOD’s research and development in small satellites does not just pertain to 
MILSATCOM, but includes forays into ISR payloads as well. Kestrel Eye is a 
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nanosatellite demonstration developed by Quantum Research International, Inc. and 
SMDC (Keller 2014). The Kestrel Eye is a small, low-cost satellite designed to capture 
electro-optical images with 1.5-meter resolution and downlink those images directly to 
mobile and disadvantaged war fighter terminals within 10 minutes. The demonstration is 
meant to show that a tactical nanosat can be built relatively quickly and cheaply in large 
numbers in order to provide persistent surveillance coverage directly to war fighters 
without having to be routed to a central location for processing first (Keller 2014). While 
it has not been launched yet, SMDC continues to develop, test, and evaluate the Kestrel 
Eye nanosat as a potential ISR solution. 
Ongoing R&D efforts from commands such as SMDC and SPAWAR closely 
mimic the commercial sector’s aggressive research into the use of small satellites over 
the past decade. While the success of those command’s efforts demonstrate the potential 
of small satellites as an effective capability and also the acceptance of this new 
technology within the DOD, there is still more work to be done before a DOD small 
satellite program is operational. Besides suggesting more research in small satellite 
technology, the GAO’s 2014 study also stated transition from an R&D program into an 
operational one is not easy and would require potentially costly modifications to the 
acquisitions process. There are many aspects of the space acquisitions process that need 
to be addressed to make that transition, and this thesis seeks to address one of them. 
Specifically, this thesis seeks to improve decision making during the conceptual design 
phase of systems acquisition by presenting a model and tool that can provide design trade 
space analysis much earlier in the process. While the model and tool provided in this 
work are not a complete solution, they do offer a better method for supporting decision 
makers more effectively and efficiently, which should help improve the DOD space 
acquisitions process. 
2. High Altitude Air Ships 
High Altitude Air Ships (HAAS), also known as high altitude atmospheric 
satellites, are essentially unmanned blimps that are designed to operate autonomously in 
the stratosphere (i.e., 60,000+ feet) for extended periods of time (Lockheed Martin 
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2016a). The advantageous attributes of HAAS platforms are long endurance time on-
station to provide persistent capability, large coverage areas (30,000+ square miles), 
capability of launch and recovery without the need of a runway, support for 
interchangeable mission payloads (i.e., communications, ISR, weather observation), and 
lower costs than other aircraft and satellites. While HAAS are relatively new and there 
has been limited work on the technology, the DOD, especially the U.S. Army, has shown 
recent interest in the platform. 
The U.S. Army’s first foray into HAAS platforms began in 2005 with the 
development of the Hi-Sentinel program, designed by the Southwest Research Institute 
(SwRI) (Southwest Research Institute 2005). SwRI worked with Aerostar International 
and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to design and test the feasibility of 
blimps carrying communication satellites above enemy territories. The Hi-Sentinel tests 
proved successful remote control of unmanned blimps at an altitude of 74,000 feet by 
personnel on the ground, though these initial HAAS platforms could stay on-station only 
for five hours.   
The U.S. Army followed up Hi-Sentinel with the Long Endurance Multi-
Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) in 2009 (Cummings 2009). The LEMV was designed by 
Hybrid Air Vehicles, a British firm, and meant to conduct surveillance missions in 
Afghanistan for up to 21 days at a time (Page 2014). In 2011, Lockheed Martin built a yet 
another HAAS platform for the U.S. Army named the High Altitude Long Endurance-
Demonstrator (HALE-D) (Lockheed Martin 2016a). The HALE-D system successfully 
demonstrated launch and control, remote command and control, and communication 
links. Unfortunately for the HAAS programs, the end of the Iraq war eroded the U.S. 
Army’s interest and thus their funding (Krisch 2014). While initially an interest area for 
this research and work, HAAS was not investigated further as a potential solution due to 
time and resource constraints. However, it is highly recommended that future work 
expand the work of this thesis to include HAAS as a potential solution. 
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C. THE CURRENT STATE OF DOD SMALL SATELLITE RESEARCH 
Over the past decade, studies and research have been conducted regarding the use 
of small satellites in U.S. military operations. Unfortunately, there are still many 
unknowns that are slowing progress in this area, which are briefly addressed in this 
thesis. These major areas that require further research include analysis of small satellite 
design, constellation design, and improving the small satellite cost and acquisition 
process. 
1. Analysis of Small Satellite Design 
Research regarding small satellite design can fall into one of two general 
categories. The first category takes a top-down approach to the design of small satellites 
by extrapolating from large satellite designs and then focusing on concepts such as a 
standardized bus design and the trade-off between miniaturization and the loss of 
capability. The second takes a bottom-up approach, looking at very specific small 
satellite programs, discussing their design, potential deployment, and use, and factors that 
led to the initial requirement. While each category of research provides greater insight 
into the design and nature of small satellites, neither provides concrete, implementable 
recommendations to the DOD that can be used across multiple small satellite programs 
rather than a single, specific program. 
a. Determining Small Satellite Design 
In their conference paper titled, “Right-sizing Small Satellites,” David J. Barnhart 
and Martin N. Sweeting discussed their attempt to optimize small satellite design. In their 
work, Barnhart and Sweeting examined the possibility of designing small satellites at the 
right size by using three top-down design factors: spacecraft utility, mission utility, and 
optimum cost (Barnhart and Sweeting 2014). For each of those design factors, the authors 
devised their own theoretical equations in an effort to score potential small satellite 
designs with the end goal of optimizing a specific satellite size that would meet the needs 
for any number of proposed missions. A “perfect” size is very desirable, but assumes that 
the same size can be used for any mission and any set of stakeholder requirements. In the 
world of DOD acquisitions, system standardization across numerous stakeholders can be 
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very difficult if not impossible. It may be more valuable instead to focus on “robust 
design” by presenting a range of design alternatives with adjustable preferences in order 
to attempt to provide a decision maker with a trade space and allow him/her to meet as 
many of the requirement nuances of different stakeholders as possible. 
b. Constellation Design for a Single Small Satellite Program 
One example of small satellite research that looked at constellation design is 
Clayton Jarolimek’s NPS thesis titled, “An Analysis of the Use of Nanosatellite 
Technology for Military Ultra-High Frequency Communications.” In his 2014 work, 
Jarolimek looked at the Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) Nanosatellite 
Program (SNaP-3) and how a constellation of SNaP-3 satellites could be used to meet the 
needs of the stakeholder, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). 
USSOUTHCOM’s primary mission requirement was to provide Ultra-High Frequency 
(UHF) communications to disadvantaged users (i.e., tactically deployed warfighters). 
Jarolimek used design information provided by the SMDC to build SNaP-3 constellation 
design models in System Toolkit (STK), a satellite-modeling program, and compared the 
different designs based on criteria such as coverage area, access duration, and revisit 
time. Jarolimek was able to show how the DOD could benefit from the use of decision 
support tools to design an efficient constellation of small satellites based on stakeholder 
requirements. However, it would have been better if the decision support tools were used 
pre-design so that the analysis and insight gained from the tools could have helped inform 
design. This thesis attempts to follow Jarolimek’s reasoning, but provides tools to support 
the analysis of satellite design based on mission requirements earlier in the acquisitions 
process, rather than providing analysis post-satellite design as Jarolimek has done. 
2. Small Satellite Cost Estimation and Acquisition 
Another area of concentration for DOD small satellite analysis is cost estimation 
and acquisitions. This is an important consideration because cost savings are one of the 
proposed advantages for using small satellites as opposed to larger satellites. In their 
paper titled, “Microsatellites and Improved Acquisitions of Space Systems,” authors 
Bille, Kane, and Cox (2000) introduced a conceptual approach for effectively acquiring 
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microsatellites (microsats), which they named the Microsat Acquisition Paradigm 
(MAP). The authors’ MAP approach is built on three pillars: 1) understanding the 
military’s space requirements, 2) correlating those requirements with the physical 
capabilities of current microsat technology, and 3) the reality that microsats can be 
acquired with cost and time effectiveness in mind (a departure from larger satellites). The 
MAP approach conceptually fits with the intent of this thesis, but the authors do not offer 
an actual solution for implementing their approach. The MAP approach instead provides 
tenets to follow, which would make the use of microsats a desirable option for the DOD 
compared to continuing to acquire larger satellites. This thesis takes the MAP’s ideology 
a step further by providing a tool to assist in implementing the MAP approach. 
D. MODELING TO ILLUSTRATE TRADE SPACE  
While the DOD and subordinate commands use various forms of the SE process 
during satellite design and acquisitions, new SE techniques may offer the DOD insight 
not previously gained. The use of modeling and simulations (M&S) in systems design is 
not a novel idea, but within the DOD and at NPS, its use has primarily been with regards 
to more traditional warfare areas such as naval ship design. An NPS thesis titled, “A 
Capability-Based Meta-Model Approach to Combatant Ship Design,” written by Jason 
Fox in 2011, explored this idea. Fox used M&S to show how using combat/operational 
measures of effectiveness (MOE) as requirements early in the system design process 
rather than using physical constraints/factors (i.e., speed, stability, size, length) would 
produce a more effective naval ship for a specific mission (Fox 2011). Specifically, Fox 
used a design of experiments (DOE), a methodology used to determine the relationship 
between input design factors and the resultant output response of a process (SAS 2016a). 
By understanding the cause-and-effect relationship between input factors and output 
responses, output responses can be improved by manipulating the dominant input factors 
to maximize combat effectiveness. Fox used this process to understand the relationship 
between ship physical characteristics and combat effectiveness for the U.S. Navy’s 
maritime interdiction operations (MIO). This thesis seeks to use a similar methodology 
by using the SE process to identify input factors and output responses based on 
stakeholder requirements, using DOE to identify the most dominant input factors that 
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maximize satellite combat effectiveness, and presenting an interactive trade space that 
visualizes the relationships between the dominating factors and the responses the 
stakeholders desire. 
E. CONCLUSION 
As discussed, a gap exists within the DOD’s current fleet of satellites. Despite a 
continuous evolution, DOD satellite design continues to cling to the outdated concept of a 
few large and expensive satellites. Unfortunately, that methodology faces new challenges 
that threaten to disrupt and degrade the DOD’s SATCOM and ISR capabilities. New 
technologies like small satellites have emerged, providing a potential solution to these 
new threats. However, while research and development in small satellites as an 
alternative is ongoing, it requires additional tools to assist in the design and acquisitions 
process. This thesis seeks to address that gap. By using the methodologies of MBSE and 
DOE, this thesis provides tools that will assist decision makers early in conceptual design 
by allowing analysis of a small satellite’s physical trade space. 
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III. APPLYING THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses how early steps of the SE process were applied to the 
design of DOD small satellites for MILSATCOM and ISR missions. This process 
included defining the problem and need, conducting stakeholder, requirements, and 
functional analyses, and identifying the key factors that would inform and influence the 
design of a potential small satellite solution. While this thesis was not focused on 
designing any specific small satellite, the SE process used in this chapter was needed to 
identify the key design factors necessary to drive the modeling and development of the 
decision support tools this thesis produced. By using the SE process to set a foundation 
for tool development, this thesis was able to provide decision support tools that will assist 
in the early conceptual design of potential small satellite solutions. The results of this 
chapter justify the selection of the input factors and output responses used in model 
development by providing traceability to actual DOD requirements. 
A. PROBLEM REFINEMENT 
Before applying a SE process to the problem introduced in Chapters  I and II, it is 
important to clearly delineate the efforts of this thesis versus those of the systems 
engineering process. The application of the SE process in this chapter is concerned with 
building a solution to the DOD’s overall problem of satellite resiliency. If a complete and 
thorough SE process was being conducted, additional “system of systems” details would 
be needed, such as interoperability, ground stations, and user (i.e., a warfighter) 
equipment. However, those details are outside the scope of this thesis, which is focused 
on building a decision support tool to assist in the space acquisitions process. Thus, a 
modified version of the SE process is used in this chapter, and is limited to providing just 
the data needed to support tool development. Before the SE process can be addressed, the 
scope and assumptions of this thesis must be discussed. The scope and assumptions of 




Stating the scope helps to determine what aspects of the system should and should 
not be included within the body of work based on the limitations set by the project 
boundaries (Langford 2012, 41–42). Establishing scope ensures that one does not stray 
from the objectives of the effort when making decisions. While the scope can be no larger 
than the understood boundaries of the system, it can be minimized and focused further in 
an effort to solve a specific aspect of the problem. This thesis is concerned with 
developing decision support tools to be used during early needs refinement and 
conceptual design of a small satellite, an emergent system solution that can potentially 
resist emerging ASAT threats and budgetary constraints. This thesis was scoped in the 
following way. 
 This thesis is focused on the prospects of a small satellite as a solution to 
the stakeholder’s problem. Normally, the SE process does not focus on 
alternative system solutions until much later, but this thesis will focus only 
on small satellites as a solution. Other potential solutions, such as HAAS, 
hosted payloads on commercial satellites, or wholly relying on a 
commercial solution will not be investigated. Those alternatives should be 
examined, but remain outside the scope of this thesis. 
 This thesis will focus primarily on the physical characteristics of a small 
satellite, and not on other factors such as political or operational 
considerations. Typically, those concerns are considered during the design 
phase of the SE process, which is assumed to be future work. Thus, this 
thesis will not focus outside of the system boundary. 
 While elements of the decision support tools introduced later will touch on 
the number of satellites desired, the context is from a mass, sizing, and 
cost perspective and not on operational employment. This thesis is only 
concerned with conceptual design and not details, production, or 
operations. Thus, the design of a constellation is not within the scope of 
this work either, with the understanding that the proposed satellite would 
likely operate in a constellation. 
 Similar to the design of a constellation, ground stations and user segments 
are outside the scope of this thesis. Obviously they are important factors 
and are necessary for completing the satellite system as a whole, but this 
thesis is not concerned with their design or deployment. These 
considerations would come later in the SE process if every step of the SE 
process was being applied. 
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 The life cycle and disposal of the small satellite at end of life are not 
within the scope of this thesis. The only considerations given to life cycle 
in this work are the realization that a small satellite solution will have a 
much shorter lifespan (i.e., one to five operational years) compared to the 
DOD’s larger satellites (i.e., 10 to 15 operational years), and the idea that 
small satellites should be capable of reconstitution much faster compared 
to larger satellites. 
 This thesis is not focused on any particular unit, command, or branch of 
service within the DOD. While small satellites may offer greater 
optimization for specific missions compared to large satellites designed to 
satisfy multiple missions that may conflict, that was not an area of focus 
for this thesis. This thesis maintained a broader view of the DOD’s need 
for small satellites rather than what the U.S. Navy, Army, or Air Force 
needed for their own respective warfare areas. 
The scoping of this thesis serves to focus the work in this chapter by providing 
clear delineation of the concentration areas. Due to the limitations of time and resources, 
assumptions must also be stated to serve as justification for liberties taken over the course 
of the thesis work. Similar to scoping the effort, stating the assumptions identifies which 
details the thesis concentrated on and which details were ignored. Listing the assumptions 
allowed this thesis to disregard details that are critical considerations for implementing a 
system solution in the real world but are also details that would detract from the intent of 
this work. 
2. Assumptions 
This thesis focused on a specific solution to a large problem, namely, small 
satellites. As such, assumptions must be stated so that the focus of the effort can be 
understood and realized. To pare down the problem to a manageable size, the following 
assumptions were made: 
 The design and build of the system solution (i.e., the small satellite) will 
come after the use of the tools developed by this thesis. 
 This thesis did not consider ground stations or user terminals and assumes 
that a proposed satellite design will be interoperable with the current 
system. 
 Monetary costs will only consider research and development costs, build 
costs, and launch costs. 
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 Acquisition time will include the time needed to design a satellite, build a 
satellite, and launch a satellite. 
 The DOD has in place a small satellite acquisitions process that can be 
improved with the creation of decision support tools. 
 Any procedural, programmatic, or other problems within the DOD’s 
acquisitions process will not affect satellite design. 
 The mission requirements guiding conceptual design of a system solution 
(i.e., a small satellite) will not change during the course of the satellite’s 
acquisition and build. 
These stated assumptions serve to clarify the focus of this thesis and identify the 
context in which the SE process was applied. Because of the refined scope of this thesis, 
not all steps of the SE process were applied to the problem. Instead, only the SE steps 
pertinent to the thesis were applied, specifically, the definition of need and the conceptual 
design phase. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE SE PROCESS 
Unlike other engineering disciplines, SE is a methodology that can be applied to 
nearly any field of industry or study. SE is concerned with solving problems by clearly 
identifying the current gaps causing the problem, stating requirements of a proposed 
solution, and using those requirements to design and build a system solution, ensuring 
that the system solution efficiently and effectively solves the stated problem. To ensure 
consistent results and application across all disciplines, the SE process was created. The 
SE process contains principles and objectives of SE that are generally agreed upon, but 
can vary in implementation from one system to the next based on the nature of the system 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 33). Within the DOD, there is a particular desire to 
ensure the SE process encompasses and is applied to the entire system life cycle. The 





Figure 13.  System Life Cycle Process 
 
Adapted from: Blanchard, Benjamin S., and Wolter J. Fabrycky. 2011. Systems Engineering 
and Analysis. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
As the figure illustrates, these phases include conceptual design, preliminary 
design, detail design and development, production and/or construction, utilization and 
support, and phase-out and disposal. All of these steps are needed to develop a system 
solution; however, the focus of this thesis is to provide DOD decision makers with a 
decision support tool to evaluate the feasibility of a potential system solution (i.e., a small 
satellite). Therefore, this thesis is not concerned with the development of an actual space 
system or its life cycle. Rather, this thesis only focuses on definition of the need and the 
conceptual design phase, highlighted in red in  Figure 13. While Blanchard and 
Fabrycky’s system life cycle process diagram does not expand on the definition of need, 
this step is both the most difficult and the most important step to complete. Defining the 
need is characterized by defining the problem on hand, which facilitates identification of 
the gap (i.e., the need) that must be filled in order to solve the problem. Improperly or 
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insufficiently defining the need indicates a lack of understanding of the true problem in 
question, and thus can produce a less effective system solution for the problem. This step 
is closely followed in importance by the conceptual design phase. The conceptual design 
phase expands on defining the need by turning the need into requirements, functions, and 
performance measures for the system solution. This phase begins to define what the 
system must be, what it must do, and how to measure its effectiveness. Similar to 
defining the problem, poor execution of this phase produces an inaccurate system 
solution, which can prove costly in the long term. Figure 14 illustrates the life cycle 
commitment throughout the SE process phases. 
Figure 14.  Life-Cycle Commitment during the Systems Engineering Process 
 
Source: Blanchard, Benjamin S., and Wolter J. Fabrycky. 2011. Systems Engineering and 
Analysis. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ. Prentice Hall.  
As the figure shows, over 50% of the commitment to technology, configuration, 
performance, and cost is achieved upon completing the conceptual design phase, yet less 
than 5% of the costs have been incurred. Thus, it is easy to understand why the ease  
of change quickly diminishes from 100% to 50% just during conceptual design. Any 
large changes to the chosen technology, configuration, or performance past that point will 
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likely produce large cost and schedule overruns. It is apparent that an accurate definition 
of need and a conceptual design set the foundation for a successful design and 
development process, and thus are the primary focus of this thesis’s application of the SE 
process. 
As Figure 13 shows, the first step is to define the need that must be fulfilled, 
which spawns from understanding the problem. Once the problem is identified and 
understood, the needs for a potential solution/system can be identified. Identification of 
needs explicitly state the requirements of the system, which are primarily defined and 
stated by the key stakeholders. Thus, stakeholder analysis must also be conducted, which 
will produce a list of stakeholder needs, limitations, and constraints for the system 
solution. After completing the stakeholder analysis, an exploration of the system 
solution’s boundary conditions can be completed. This step can help refine the 
understanding of the problem by further defining the context and space of the problem 
despite not being a formal step within the conceptual design phase. This thesis will also 
conduct a requirements and functional analysis, allocate functions to satellite subsystems, 
and identify performance measures during the latter steps of the conceptual design phase. 
Those final steps will identify the key factors that will be used to build the synthesis 
model, and thus are critical steps to accomplish. Tracing the key factors identified by this 
chapter back to DOD requirements ensures that the models and the decision support tools 
developed by this thesis are accurate. 
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Defining system need begins with identifying a problem or deficiency for which 
the system will provide a solution (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 32–33). By first 
identifying the problem to solve, capabilities and requirements the system must satisfy in 
order to solve the dilemma can then be identified. Failure to appropriately define the 
problem can lead to a “design-it-now-fix-it-later” mentality that often results in an 
overrun in cost for a system. The Space Mission Analysis and Design (SMAD) process 
defines this step as “define objectives” for space systems (Wertz and Larson 2010, 2). 
During this phase, it is imperative the systems engineer understands as much as possible 
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regarding the problem and the context in which the system solution will be used. 
Developing an operational concept to describe how the system will operate as well as 
producing a context diagram to illustrate the relationships and interactions of the system 
sharpen the understanding of the problem, ensuring the appropriate factors are considered 
when developing a system to solve the stated problem. These products allow the systems 
engineer to see the larger “picture” so that critical aspects of the proposed system solution 
are not lost. 
1. Operational Concept 
An operational concept is a narrative that describes the characteristics of a system 
based on its functions and how a user will operate the system. The operational concept 
used for this chapter focuses on the following: 
 System solutions that acquire a satellite at a relatively cheaper price than 
the cost of current large DOD satellites. Cost savings can possibly be 
achieved through cheaper parts and/or a reduction in spacecraft mass. 
 A satellite that is rapidly built and launched into an advantageous orbit. 
 A satellite that provides a capability (MILSATCOM or ISR collection in 
this case) to benefit the warfighter. 
 A satellite that is managed and operated by an assigned DOD command 
that ensures the satellite is functioning as intended or conducts repairs as 
needed. 
 A satellite that communicates with ground stations globally, transmitting 
down its mission data and receiving new commands. The satellite may 
also be designed to communicate with individual units or personnel who 
are forward deployed and not tied into the DOD’s land-based 
communications infrastructure. These units can range from a single U.S. 
Navy vessel steaming in the middle of the ocean to a SOF unit with a 
small, portable antenna operating in the mountains. 
 Forward-deployed units will not have any control over the satellite’s 
operations; only use of the products (i.e., imagery) or capability (i.e., 
communications channel) it provides. 
These considerations describe the context in which the proposed system solution 
is to be operated. This further illustrates areas on which this chapter focused when 
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applying the SE process. The operational concept of the system can be enhanced further 
by the context diagram, which will illustrate the interactions. 
2. Context Diagram 
A context diagram enhances the operational concept by providing a broader 
understanding of the system, and allowing stakeholders to visualize how a proposed 
system solution may be used in a larger system of systems as well as how it may interact 
with other systems or objects. This thesis will focus on the proposed system solution of a 
small satellite. Figure 15 is a context diagram for the small satellite system, depicting the 
general relationships between the satellite and other systems and objects with which it 
will interact. 
Figure 15.  Context Diagram 
 
 
The square cells at the top of the figure represent external and lateral systems that 
have a two-way interaction with the small satellite, denoted with the double-sided arrows. 
These objects have an influence on the satellite, but are also influenced by the satellite, 
either through physical, functional, or behavioral means. In the case of the launch vehicle 
and ground segment, decisions made in their design or selection are likely influenced by 
 42
the satellite’s own design and vice versa. For the warfighter, his/her behavior (i.e., 
operating procedures, CONOPs) is modified by the presence of the satellite, but user 
preferences may modify aspects of the satellite’s design as well. The elliptical cells at the 
bottom of the figure represent context systems that impose an influence on the satellite’s 
design and operations, but are not affected by the satellite’s design. The actions, 
behaviors, and/or conditions of these systems likely influenced the system’s functionality 
and design. While a deeper consideration for how these systems affect each other can be 
made, that examination remains outside the scope of this thesis, which will focus solely 
on physical considerations. 
3. Definition of the Problem 
Developing the operational concept of the system and illustrating the system’s 
context diagram provide a foundation of understanding with regards to the problem. 
Combined with the research conducted in Chapter II, there is ample understanding to 
accurately define the DOD’s problem, which is as follows: the DOD wants to continue 
improving its space force enhancement capabilities by using satellites to provide over-
the-horizon communications as well as collecting and supplying ISR products to the 
tactical warfighter. The issue the DOD faces is that large, highly capable satellites are 
very expensive and take many years to design, develop, and launch before becoming 
operational. Large satellites are becoming a less enticing solution considering the DOD’s 
reduction in budget, the rapidly growing threat of ASAT weapons, and the time and 
money it takes to develop large  satellites. To this end, the DOD is searching for 
innovative solutions that provide “enough” capability to enhance and support the 
warfighter but at a fraction of the cost and time needed for larger satellite programs. 
D. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Once a foundational understanding of the system is achieved and the problem 
identified, the needs of a system solution can be defined. While a general idea of the 
needs now exists as a result of the problem definition, conducting a stakeholder analysis 
will further refine the system needs. A stakeholder analysis allows more introspective 
analysis with regard to not only what a system solution must do but also what the 
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stakeholders need the system to do in order to solve the problem. This also affords the 
stakeholders an opportunity to voice any limitations or constraints of the system, which 
will inform the system requirements and design. Typically, a stakeholder analysis 
includes stakeholder interviews and meetings with stakeholders, however, due to time 
and resource constraints as well as the breadth of programs, this thesis primarily relied on 
extensive research, and in some cases, the author’s expertise as a military space 
professional, to conduct the stakeholder analysis. This research focused on exploring the 
boundaries of the defined problem to elucidate conditions that may not have been initially 
understood during the problem and needs identification phase. Once the stakeholder 
analysis has been completed and the boundary conditions have been studied, a 
requirements analysis can be completed with confidence. 
1. Definition of Need 
Once the initial or originating problem has been defined, the stakeholders can be 
approached in order to gain insight into their needs and wants for the system. In this case, 
this was accomplished by researching the stakeholder needs of numerous DOD programs. 
Typically, stakeholders’ needs can be represented in risk, consequential opportunity, 
influence, or essential support from the system (Langford 2012, 259). Examples of needs 
can include the risk of a stakeholder’s reputation or monetary investment, an opportunity 
to profit or benefit from the system, the influence a system may have on a stakeholder’s 
business or behavior, or that a system is necessary for the stakeholder to conduct 
business. While a system may have a wide range of stakeholders with needs at different 
levels of the system’s functionality and life cycle, conducting a detailed stakeholder 
analysis can identify the key stakeholders whose needs should outweigh others, and thus 
have greater influence on the system. Key stakeholders are likely organizations or people 
who are investing time, money, and effort to build the system, people who directly 
benefit from the resolution of  the problem, or people who will be operating or using the 
system. For the purposes of this thesis, the key stakeholders are the DOD, which provides 
the budget to space and acquisition commands; the space acquisition professionals, who 
acquire space systems; and the warfighters, who will use the space-based capability. 
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For this problem, research was conducted to collect stakeholder needs of 
numerous DOD space programs to build a base of knowledge. While the research was not 
optimal due to the number of varied DOD space programs examined, it identified a wide 
sample of stakeholder mission needs and allowed confident determination of the primary 
and most common needs across space and small satellite programs. The following 
stakeholder needs were the most common among the various programs researched. 
 Supporting the warfighter during combat operations. 
 Meeting DOD MILSATCOM and/or ISR mission requirements. 
 Minimizing system and life cycle costs. 
 Minimizing the time needed to design, build, and launch. 
 Improving resiliency to deter and mitigate adversary attack. 
In addition to these primary needs, the research uncovered the following gaps 
that, if addressed, could also support the stakeholder needs. 
 A method for determining whether a spacecraft program or a spacecraft 
design will meet the mission needs. 
 A method of identifying key factors that are driving a spacecraft’s design 
based on the stated stakeholder requirements. 
 A method for analyzing trade-offs based on stated stakeholder 
requirements early in spacecraft conceptual design. 
Based on the research, it is evident the DOD warfighter needs satellite 
communications and ISR imagery to conduct mission operations. This is especially 
important for disadvantaged warfighters who operate in areas without reliable 
communications due to lack of infrastructure or environmental obstacles. Space offers a 
potential solution through satellites, but for space to be operationally feasible, the DOD 
needs to minimize the cost and time needed to create and launch these satellites while 
validating their benefit to operational effectiveness. 
2. Limitations and Constraints 
Another aspect of identifying stakeholder needs is identifying the limitations and 
constraints of a system solution. Both limits and constraints are consequences of 
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decisions made by people within the system design process. Limits are “conditions of 
boundaries,” given by the domain of the problem, and are unchangeable (Langford 2012, 
361). They are the physical lack of capability of a system due to design, material, or 
operational decisions. The physical limitations of the small satellite are listed below. 
 Shall fit in a launch vehicle approved for DOD-use. 
 Shall have a mass no greater than 500 kilograms. 
 Shall operate in a space environment and obey the laws of physics and 
orbital mechanics. 
Constraints, on the other hand, are “conditions of allocations” that can be changed 
even once established (Langford 2012, 355). Constraints are restrictions placed on the 
system by someone, typically someone from a decision-making place of power such as 
the stakeholder or a program director. In terms of the proposed small satellite solution, 
the major constraints would be communicated by the DOD and would restrict the small 
satellite design even before a concept is brainstormed. The constraints for small satellites 
are listed below. 
 Shall be built and launched in less than one year. 
 Shall cost less than current DOD satellite programs. 
These lists of limitations and constraints are not intended to be all-inclusive, but 
instead present the more significant and most influential limits and constraints on a 
proposed small satellite system in this scenario. Due to time constraints, this thesis 
focused on the immediate limitations and constraints, but future work may expand these 
lists given more time. 
3. Boundary Conditions 
In his 2012 book “Engineering Systems Integration,” Langford (2012) defined 
boundaries as a limit “predicated on a perspective,” marking the end of one factor so as to 
delineate the extent of that factor (354). Langford further describes three types of 
boundaries, two of which were applied to this thesis. A physical boundary is 
characterized as the physical limits of a single object’s matter without consideration of 
interaction with a second object (365). A functional boundary is determined by the 
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interaction of two objects and the resultant action from their interaction (358). In these 
cases, boundaries are pre-determined limits of the system, established by the nature and 
function of the system, and not set by a stakeholder or an engineer. Understanding a 
system’s boundaries enhances understanding of the system’s purpose and its relationship 
with other systems and objects, and thus the requirements of the system. 
a. Physical Boundary 
The primary physical boundaries associated with this system are the small 
satellite to be designed, the launch vehicle, and low Earth orbit where the satellite will 
operate. Physical boundaries for the small satellite are primarily focused on its size, 
though the physical boundary considerations may include numerous others, but they were 
determined to be outside the scope of this thesis. The launch vehicle’s physical boundary 
is based on the size of its fairing, the compartment where the satellite will be stowed for 
launch into orbit. The fairing has a specific size into which the satellite(s) must fit. The 
physical boundary of LEO is the total altitude range, which was defined by the scope of 
this thesis. Orbits and any space objects operating within them are obviously bounded by 
the laws of physics, particularly orbital mechanics. Physical boundaries that will be 
considered are as follows: 
 Satellite mass 
 Satellite linear length 
 Launch vehicle fairing volume (height and diameter) 
 LEO altitude range of 200–1000 kilometers 
As will be shown later, the physical boundaries listed here will be important 
considerations during the development of the decision support tools as both input factors 
and output responses. This thesis is primarily concerned with the physical feasibility of a 
small satellite, so the physical boundaries provide quantifiable measurements for 
analysis. 
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b. Functional Boundary 
Since requirements inform the functionality of the system, the system’s functional 
boundary is defined by the stakeholder’s requirements. A more detailed assessment of 
system requirements will be completed after consideration of the boundaries, but enough 
information has already been gathered through research to provide a basic definition of 
the system’s functional boundaries. The functional boundaries that will be considered are 
as follows: 
 Perform its mission. The system shall perform the function of capturing 
ISR imagery or receiving and transmitting communications, but it cannot 
be expected to perform a function for which it was not designed. 
 Perform functions inherent of a satellite, such as power generation, 
attitude determination and control, survive the space environment, 
communication, orbital maintenance, and possibly maneuvering. 
While the first functional boundary is obvious, the second is not, and it is 
important to capture because it’s not addressed in any requirements analysis, but does 
have a significant impact on success. As expected, the functional boundaries of the 
system are entirely tied to the capabilities that will be designed into the system, based on 
the requirements of the specific mission the system solution will perform. A general idea 
of those capabilities can be imagined, but details cannot be listed until requirements 
analysis for specific missions are conducted. 
E. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
After completing a stakeholder analysis and consideration of the problem’s 
boundary conditions, requirements analysis can now be conducted. As stated during 
stakeholder analysis, research was conducted on multiple DOD SATCOM and ISR small 
satellite programs, many of which were proof of concepts or test and evaluation 
programs. The programs were separated based on their mission payload (i.e., SATCOM 
versus ISR), and the mission objectives from the programs were used as the basis for this 
thesis’s system requirements. Furthermore, the requirements for the systems were sorted 
into two categories: functional and non-functional. Functional requirements state what 
the system must do; non-functional requirements state the quality of the system’s 
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performance (Langford 2015). Within each specific mission payload, there were many 
requirements shared by the different programs, many of which focused on functionality 
and capability. However, the programs also shared multiple non-functional requirements, 
such as a lower cost and increased response time (i.e., shorter build time). These shared 
functional and non-functional requirements highlight that different commands and 
services within the DOD often share the same needs and wants for a space-based 
solution. 
Five DOD ISR small satellite programs and eight DOD MILSATCOM small 
satellite programs were researched. Two charts detailing the DOD programs researched 
and the mission requirements found for each program can be seen in the appendix. The 
charts in the appendix were then screened and quantified through numeration of common 
requirements. In addition to the stakeholder requirements, there are system design 
requirements of a satellite that must be addressed in order for the satellite to operate in 
space. These system design requirements were based on common satellite design 
knowledge and added to the list of functional and non-functional requirements if they 
were not already covered by stakeholder requirements. Table 1 shows a list of the initial 
functional and non-functional requirements. 
Table 1.   Functional and Non-functional Requirements 
Functional Non-Functional 
To provide power To fit in the launch vehicle fairing 
To regulate power To survive the launch environment 
To store power To lower program costs 
To transmit spacecraft health data To lower spacecraft weight  
To receive telemetry To fit a CubeSat structure/reduce size 
To navigate position To achieve the reliability threshold 
To launch to LEO To pass usability testing 
To determine spacecraft attitude To rapidly develop and launch 
To control spacecraft attitude To be a non-nationally tasked system 
To maintain spacecraft operational and 
survivable temperature 
To be interoperable with current DOD 
networks 
To maneuver To easily reconstitute/replenish 
To maintain orbital position  
To provide OTH/BLOS communications  
To collect mission ISR  
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To operate in UHF band  
To secure communications  
To provide timely communications  
To support disadvantaged users  
 
As the table shows, most of the functional and non-functional requirements refer 
to the satellite bus (the body or structure of the satellite that houses the payload) or 
common satellite subsystems rather than a specific mission payload, further suggesting 
that multiple shared commonalities exist between different DOD command requirements 
of small satellites. The requirements highlighted in yellow represent categorized 
requirements that came from the DOD, as compared to non-highlighted design 
requirements that focus on satellite functionality as described by the functional boundary. 
While this initial requirements list does not separate the functional and non-functional 
requirements by spacecraft payload, the next step of functional analysis and allocation 
will separate them to allow for more detailed analysis. 
F. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND ALLOCATION 
After completing requirements analysis, functional analysis could be conducted 
based on the requirements, followed by allocation of functions to spacecraft subsystems. 
The functional and non-functional requirements identified were divided among broader 
function areas for the satellite, producing a functional hierarchy, which provided 
organization for the many specific functions and non-functional requirements the 
spacecraft must possess. The functional hierarchy prevented the thesis from going outside 
its scope by becoming too granular in detail, and also provided a foundation for 
allocating functions to spacecraft subsystems. Figure 16 shows how functions were 
organized into broader function areas. 
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Figure 16.  Functional Hierarchy Chart 
 
 
As the figure shows, the functional hierarchy chart was developed based on the 
mission requirements identified in the appendix and the functional decomposition 
displayed in Table 1. The functional hierarchy chart organizes the specific functions of 
the spacecraft system into broader functional categories. The area outlined in red 
represent the functional requirements and the area outlined in blue represent the non-
functional requirements. While most of the functions and terms used are common 
concepts, “TT&C” may need explanation. Telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) 
refers to communication between the satellite and the ground station responsible for 
monitoring the satellite’s position at all times and managing its operation and use. 
The next step is to allocate the functions from broad functional categories into 
specific spacecraft subsystems through a functional requirements matrix. This step 
provides traceability of requirements, identifying which subsystems will provide which 
functions, and also ensures that all functions deemed important are accounted for in 
preliminary conceptual design. A functional requirements matrix was made for each of 
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the space force enhancement mission areas, ISR and MILSATCOM. Table 2 illustrates 
the ISR functional requirements matrix. 
Table 2.   ISR Functional Requirements Matrix 
 
 
As the ISR figure shows, eight subsystems were identified. Payload refers to the 
mission hardware; ISR in this case. Propulsion refers to the satellite’s ability to 
maneuver. Electrical power system (EPS) refers to the production, maintenance, and use 
of electrical power. Thermal refers to the regulation and control of the satellite’s 
temperature during operation. Telemetry, tracking, command, and data handling 
(TT&C&DH) refers to communication with the ground control station responsible for 
managing and operating the satellite, as well as the satellite’s ability to store data when 
unable to immediately transmit data to the ground. The attitude determination and control 
system (ADCS) controls the orientation of the satellite (i.e., which way the satellite is 
facing) while in orbit. Launch vehicle refers to the rocket chosen to carry the satellite to 
 52
orbit. Structure refers to body of the satellite that protects its internal subsystems, and 
performs load bearing and appendage support. This thesis did not assign functions below 
the subsystem level due to the scope of the thesis, but all functions are accounted for and 
allocated. Very few of the functions are performed or shared by multiple subsystems, 
which is desired. The functions that are shared by subsystems are either non-functional 
requirements or are involved with the launch. A functional requirements matrix for 
MILSATCOM was also developed, illustrated by Table 3. 
Table 3.   MILSATCOM Functional Requirements Matrix 
 
 
As the figure shows, the SATCOM payload functions are dominated by the 
payload subsystem as well as the TT&C&DH subsystem, highlighted in red, which is 
obvious because of the MILSATCOM mission. Comparison between the ISR and 
MILSATCOM functional requirements matrixes show that there are a number of 
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identical functional requirements shared between an ISR satellite and a MILSATCOM 
satellite. The primary differences can be found within the payload, which is the 
subsystem that will produce the specific capability desired of the designed satellite. These 
payload capabilities will be important in key factor analysis because they drive the 
satellite’s effectiveness in a specific mission area rather than the other common 
subsystems shared by all satellites. 
G. KEY FACTORS ANALYSIS 
The intent of this thesis is to build decision support tools to support decision 
makers and assess the feasibility of small satellites early in the conceptual design phase. 
In order to streamline the tools to ensure ease of use especially in initial development, 
complexity must be reduced. Thus, it is imperative to focus on the key factors that will 
drive a satellite’s mission effectiveness. Key factors are those that help determine a 
system’s operational effectiveness and can serve as indicators as to how well a system 
can solve the problem for which it was designed. For a DOD small satellite program, 
operational effectiveness stems from the functionality of the payload for a particular 
mission as well as physical characteristics of the spacecraft and the orbit in which it 
operates. Key factors will determine and measure how well a spacecraft system is able to 
solve the problem defined by the DOD stakeholder. The best way to quantify key factors 
is by developing a list of measurements or metrics. There are two forms of metrics used 
to determine the success or failure of a system: Measures of Performance and Measures 
of Effectiveness. 
Measures of Performance (MOPs), or technical performance measures (TPMs), 
are quantified measures of attributes and/or characteristics inherent within the system 
design (i.e., measures within the system boundary) (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 40). 
Table 4 lists all MOPs generated during the ideation process for a DOD small satellite 
system, divided into ISR and MILSATCOM mission areas. These MOPs are common 
measurements for SATCOM and ISR satellite performance within the DOD, to include 
additional considerations for cost and time. 
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Table 4.   DOD Small Satellite MOPs 
 
 
As Table 4 shows, the MOPs can vary depending on the payload and the 
measures of system effectiveness. To further reduce the complexity of the analysis, the 
highlighted MOPs were considered more important based on the stakeholder statements 
of needs gathered during the program research and MOPs common during spacecraft 
design. 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are top-level technical performance measures 
that determine whether or not or how well a characteristic of the system achieves its 
functional objective (i.e., measures outside the system boundary) (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2011, 41). MOEs are typically concerned with high-level measures of 
operational effectiveness that focus on the system’s impacts on the warfighter. However, 
due to this thesis’s need to develop requirements based on a broad array of systems rather 
than focusing on one, many of the MOEs listed relate to prioritized MOPs, ranked by 
level of importance. Table 5 divides the MOPs for each mission area into MOEs 
categories, which were taken from SMAD (Wertz, Everett, and Puschell 2011, 93). 
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Table 5.   DOD Small Satellite MOEs 
 
 
As Table 5 shows, the MOE categories are initially broad, but can have very 
specific definitions within the context of a specific mission area. The number of MOPs 
for each MOE category is also dependent on the mission areas being examined and also 
the MOPs that have the most importance to the stakeholders. While not always accurate, 
the MOE categories that possess the most MOPs can be assumed to be the MOEs most 
important to the stakeholders, and thus, can drive design decisions during trade off 
analysis. 
The MOPs and MOEs listed were derived from the thesis’s research, which 
examined mission and program requirements of numerous DOD commands that are 
exploring small satellite technology. While some of the commands stated more specific 
requirements, many of the requirements overlapped or were similar enough to be grouped 
into general categories. The overlapped requirements indicated shared needs from the 
system regardless of service affiliation or program, and thus were used in identification of 
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the key factors that would be used in development of the decision support tools. Table 6 
lists the key factors derived from the work conducted in this chapter. 
Table 6.   Key Factors 
ISR Payload Factors Comms Payload Factors Shared Factors 
Resolution at nadir Data rate Spacecraft mass 
Resolution off nadir Frequency Propellant mass 
Size of field of view (FOV) Antenna diameter Linear dimensions 
Size of field of regard 
(FOR) 
Satellite transmit power Altitude 
Wavelength Receiver’s antenna diameter Number of accesses 
(revisit) 
 Signal-to-Noise ratio Length of access per pass 
  Inclination 
  Number of satellites per 
launch 
  Cost 
 
As Table 6 shows, each payload has very specific factors based on the particular 
mission it is designed to perform. However, there are also shared factors that are common 
to all small satellites regardless of mission, most of which are tied to satellite bus 
characteristics. This suggests the potential for a common satellite bus with 
interchangeable payload modules; however, this analysis is outside the scope of this 
thesis. The purpose of this chapter was to justify the selection of factors for use in the 
decision support tools by using a well-executed systems engineering process. Although 
not fully executed, the steps of the SE process described in this chapter successfully 
derived the key factors listed in Table 6, which will inform the input factors and output 
responses of the decision support tools developed. The relationships between these key 
factors were analyzed to build the synthesis model detailed in the next chapter, providing 
the foundation for the development of the tools needed to conduct feasibility analysis of 
small satellites and assist decision makers during conceptual design. 
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IV. BUILDING THE SYNTHESIS MODEL 
The SE process discussed in chapter three provided a methodology for identifying 
the key factors with the greatest influence on early satellite design. However, the SE 
process does not present a means for analyzing the relationship between the key input 
factors and the output responses, which is critical to assessing the feasibility of the 
satellite design. MBSE and DOE were used to analyze the relationship between input 
factors and output responses. The analysis provided insight on how changes to input 
factors would constrain or expand the satellite design’s trade space. This chapter will 
discuss the use of MBSE and DOE techniques, as well as describe the tools developed to 
analyze the relationship between the key input factors and output responses, which will 
allow for the exploration of the satellite design trade space. 
A. MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
Model-based systems engineering (MBSE) is a systems engineering methodology 
that has gained momentum over the past decade. As defined by INCOSE, MBSE is a 
methodology that uses models to “support system requirements, design, analysis, and 
verification and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase.” 
(INCOSE 2007) MBSE uses models to provide a visual context for the systems 
engineering process, allowing a view of the relationships between a system’s 
requirements, structure, and behavior, rather than solely relying on documents to track 
the SE process (Haduch 2015). A key component of MBSE is system synthesis. System 
synthesis (also known as “system design”) “translates the system functional architecture 
into a physical architecture. It creates a ‘how’ for every ‘what’ and ‘how well.’” (Guerra 
2008, 3). Essentially, system synthesis translates functions the system must perform into 
physical components of the system. As U.S. military systems begin to coalesce into 
larger, more complex systems of systems, MBSE becomes an attractive analysis 
methodology for DOD research. 
Paul Beery, a faculty associate within the NPS Systems Engineering Department, 
has been applying MBSE to DOD systems analysis for over four years. In a November 
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2014 presentation given at NPS titled, “Modeling and Simulation in Support of Model-
Based Systems Engineering (MBSE),” Beery discussed his efforts to use a model-based 
approach to design large and complex DOD systems. Specifically, Beery used MBSE to 
analyze the operational effectiveness of a DOD system by gaining insight on its response 
to input factors. To do this, Beery developed an operational simulation model to look at 
the system concept of operations (CONOPs) and a physical synthesis model to look at 
physical characteristics. Ultimately, Beery developed a “dashboard” as a decision support 
tool that illustrated those effects and relationships for visual trade space analysis. While 
Beery’s work focused on a naval vessel conducting anti-surface warfare, this thesis 
sought to apply the same techniques to DOD satellite systems. 
This thesis attempts to apply Beery’s MBSE methodology to satellite design in 
order to analyze the relationship between input factors and output responses. However, 
due to the scope of the effort, this thesis focused only on the physical characteristics of a 
satellite and was not concerned with operational modeling. Using MBSE, a physical 
synthesis model was developed that demonstrated the cause and effect relationships 
between input factors and output responses. The synthesis model was then used to 
graphically illustrate a satellite’s design trade space based on input factor changes. The 
result is a pair of tools that will serve decision makers in the DOD space acquisitions 
process by providing better trade space analysis earlier in satellite conceptual design. 
B. DEVELOPING THE MS EXCEL TOOL FOR INPUT RESPONSES 
For the physical synthesis model to function as a tool, input factor data and output 
response information need to be collected from the user. A simple user interface tool was 
developed based on the “SMAD worksheet,” a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet built by 
David Cloud, a former professor within the U.S. Air Force Academy’s Department of 
Astronautics. Cloud’s SMAD worksheet is fairly complex and allows the user to design a 
spacecraft and calculate detailed subsystem parameters in high detail. The SMAD 
worksheet is currently used in both Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and USAF space 
educations courses. Figure 17 shows an example of the thermal control subsystem design 
page from the SMAD worksheet. 
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Figure 17.  SMAD Worksheet Example 
 
 
As the figure shows, the SMAD worksheet requires a lot of input from the user in 
order to calculate design outputs. While the SMAD worksheet is a helpful tool for 
satellite design, its focus on detailed design of satellite subsystems makes its resolution 
too high for the intent of this thesis. The SMAD worksheet has 47 worksheets and 
requires an understanding of satellite subsystems and engineering practices that will 
likely be outside the expertise of a typical space acquisition professional. Additionally, 
the SMAD worksheet does not provide a visualization tool of the trade space of a 
theoretical satellite design, which can be helpful for users. Therefore, a new tool was 
developed that captures the essence of the worksheet, but at a reduced level of 
complexity to support early conceptual design of a satellite without “getting into the 
weeds.” 
To reduce complexity, the MS Excel tool developed in this thesis focused on 
minimizing the number of key factors analyzed, which then required fewer inputs from 
the user and fewer outputs to be calculated. For this, the key factors identified in Chapter 
III were used and would need to be collected by the MS Excel tool. To collect these 
inputs, a draft tool was built to accept a user’s (i.e., a space acquisition professional) 
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desired input design factors and capabilities. The draft tool then took these inputs and 
calculated outputs using common spacecraft design equations from SMAD. These inputs 
and outputs were later used in a DOE and later plugged into the JMP program to build the 
meta-models used in the final trade space analysis worksheet, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
For all the worksheets in this tool, a yellow cell represents an input field that was 
deemed a key input factor in Chapter III, and included in development of the synthesis 
model. A blue cell represents an input field that is not necessarily key, but necessary to 
maintaining the tools functionality. An orange cell represents a calculated output 
response that was deemed a key output response and was thus included in development of 
the synthesis model. Pale green cells are cells that the user should not tamper with or 
modify. They were provided to support future expansion. The values in these cells are 
locked for the sake of simplicity and do not need user interaction. The following 
worksheets were developed for the MS Excel tool. 
1. Synthesis Model: ISR Payload Worksheet 
The ISR payload worksheet collected information regarding the desired 
capabilities of a proposed ISR payload. Globally accepted orbital mechanics and physics 
equations from the SMAD textbook were used to calculate all of the output responses 
displayed in this section. This worksheet was broken into five parts based on the outcome 
of Chapter III, and organized for clarity and usability. The first part is the payload optics 
section, which examined ground resolution at nadir, the altitude of the satellite, 
wavelength used, and aperture diameter. Figure 18 shows the payload optics section. 




As the figure shows, the desired resolution and altitude were key input factors in 
the synthesis model along with the calculated aperture diameter value, which was a key 
output response. Desired ground resolution at nadir was given a value range of 0.5 to five 
meters, the resolution range where imagery is most useful to military operations. Altitude 
was given a range between 200 and 1000 kilometers to represent LEO, the orbit specified 
by the researched DOD small satellite programs. Wavelength was locked at 50 
micrometers, based on SMAD’s visible spectrum value (Wertz and Larson 2010, 265). 
Ultimately, calculated aperture diameter was fixed as a key output response in order to 
support model development within JMP, which is justified by the belief that a typical 
space acquisition professional would prioritize ground resolution and altitude over 
aperture diameter. 
Figure 19 shows the off-nadir resolution section, the second part of the sheet. This 
was first included based on the possibility of a user’s interest in the resolution achieved at 
the farthest boundary of the camera’s footprint, understanding that resolution decreases as 
a point moves farther from the nadir angle (i.e. 90 degrees/directly below the satellite). 
This is an additional usability tool and was not used in generating meta-models. 
Figure 19.  Off-nadir Resolution 
 
 
As the figure shows, the user-inputted altitude from earlier is carried down, and 
once combined with a cone half-angle value to produce a slant range distance, a 
resolution can be calculated for a small satellite angled in that manner. While this section 
may be useful in some cases, it was deemed far less important than resolution at nadir 
because it was believed that a space acquisition professional would be primarily 
concerned with a small satellite’s resolution at nadir. For this reason, the off-nadir 
resolution section was not used in the final draft of either decision support tool. 
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The third section of the ISR payload worksheet was the calculated maximum 
access area. For this thesis, maximum access area is defined as the maximum footprint 
size on Earth a satellite could see from horizon to horizon, regardless of resolution. 
Figure 20 shows the maximum access area section. 
Figure 20.  Maximum Access Area 
 
 
As the figure shows, the only input value used was altitude, which was pulled 
from an earlier cell filled out by the user. Similar to the off-nadir resolution section, 
maximum access area for an ISR payload was assumed to be low priority because 
imaging small satellites commonly have a very restricted ability to image off nadir. This 
section was not included in the meta-model development, but was maintained in the MS 
Excel tool to offer additional information to the user in case it was desired. 
Figure 21 shows the field of regard (FOR) section, the fourth part of the ISR 
payload worksheet, which calculates the maximum possible area in which a satellite 
could capture imagery if it were to move its view over that area. This is a reduction of the 
maximum access area and is constrained by the maximum slew angle defined by the user. 
The inputs for this calculation are altitude and cone half angle, and used Earth geometry 
equations from SMAD (Wertz and Larson 2010, 111–113). 
Figure 21.  Field of Regard (FOR) 
 
 
As the figure shows, the cone half-angle/degrees off of nadir input was identified 
as a key input factor and included in the synthesis model. While the output of this section, 
calculated diameter of FOR, was not selected as a key output response, the cone half-
angle input on this worksheet was carried over to the orbital period/revisit time worksheet 
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and used to calculate the number of accesses in 30 days and mean access duration, which 
are key output responses. The input value for the cone half angle was limited to a 
maximum value of 75 degrees for two reasons:  1) based on the range of values set for 
altitude, a cone half angle greater than 75 degrees could not be calculated because the 
footprint would stretch beyond the horizon; and 2) this value was within the typical 
maximum of DOD systems researched. 
Figure 22 shows the field of view (FOV) section. This final section of the ISR 
worksheet calculates the maximum diameter of the area that the satellite’s camera can 
view at one time. This is again a distillation of the FOR based on constraints by the 
diameter of the FOV. 
Figure 22.  Field of View (FOV) 
 
 
As the figure shows, the initial draft of the FOV section was more flexible and 
allowed the user to choose the inputs he/she wanted to submit in order to get the 
calculated output he/she desired, but this flexibility was removed to reduce the 
complexity of the DOE, thus, pixel plane width was fixed. Desired FOV diameter was 
limited to a maximum size of 100 kilometers and pixel plate size was set to 0.03 meters 
based on values from Raytheon research on focal plane array sizing (Raytheon 2008). 
Future work can modify this setting as necessary in order to meet future needs of the tool. 
This thesis sought to keep the calculations used as simple as possible and did not focus on 
values for specific pieces of hardware that may be used. 
When the key input factors were decided, diameter of FOV was determined to be 
important because of its effect on operational capabilities, and thus it was believed that a 
space acquisition professional would want to set the field of view for the satellite. 
However, calculated payload focal length, the output response for this section, was not 
included in the synthesis model. Thus, calculated focal length’s effect on the linear 
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dimension of the satellite was not introduced into the tool. As such, FOV had no effect on 
the outputs included in the synthesis model despite being submitted as a key input factor. 
By the time the omission was discovered, there was no time to rectify the error, so this 
thesis did not correct the issue, but recommends future work address this concern. 
The ISR payload worksheet captured information deemed significant to a space 
acquisition professional who was beginning feasibility analysis of a small ISR satellite. 
As shown, accepted space design and physics equations were used to produce estimated 
output responses based on the user’s inputs. While this is a distillation of the SMAD 
worksheet, its simplicity and ease of use make it an optimal tool for addressing early 
conceptual design. The same process was used to develop a MILSATCOM payload 
worksheet, which focused heavily on the link budget equation. 
2. Synthesis Model: MILSATCOM Payload Worksheet 
The MILSATCOM payload worksheet collected information regarding the 
desired capabilities of a proposed communications payload. This worksheet is broken 
into three parts based on the outcome of Chapter III, and is again organized for clarity 
and usability. The first part is the payload communications section, which used the link 
budget equation to determine data rate based on user inputs. Figure 23 shows the payload 
communications section. 
Figure 23.  Payload Communications 
 
 
As the figure shows, altitude, the satellite’s antenna diameter and power output, 
and frequency band were key input factors in the synthesis model. Calculated data rate 
was identified as a key output response. For this spreadsheet, antenna efficiency for both 
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the satellite and receiver antennas was calculated using the equation for parabolic 
antennas. Parabolic antennas may not be appropriate considering the desire for using 
small satellites and the UHF band, so this represents an area that can be improved in 
future work. Wavelength was automatically calculated based on the user’s submitted 
frequency value. The gain of the receiver was locked and calculated from the receiver’s 
antenna diameter and power output as per the gain equation (Wertz and Larson 2010, 
553). For the purposes of this thesis, the AN/PRC-117F user terminal was used as the 
example receiver system because of its common use as a UHF SATCOM terminal for 
U.S. armed forces, but this is another design choice that can be modified in the future 
(Wikipedia 2016). The values for antenna diameter and power output were taken from a 
specifications sheet for the AN/PRC-117F system (Harris Corporation 2007, 3–13). The 
signal-to-noise ratio (i.e., Eb/No) value was locked at 9.6 decibels, the default value from 
the SMAD design worksheet (Cloud 2016). Similar to the ISR payload optics section, the 
payload communications section was more flexible in the initial MS Excel tool, allowing 
the user to decide if he/she wanted to calculate data rate, satellite antenna diameter, or 
satellite power output. However, this flexibility was removed to support the DOE. Based 
on research, it was assessed that the space acquisition professional would prioritize data 
rate available over antenna diameter and power output, so data rate was set as the output 
response. 
Figure 24 shows the off-nadir SATCOM pointing section, the second part of the 
MILSATCOM worksheet. This was first included based on the possibility of user interest 
in the data rate available at the farthest boundary of the satellite’s FOR, understanding 
that data rate may decrease as the point moves farther from the sub-satellite point. As 
with ISR, this is an additional usability tool and was not used in generating the meta-
models. 




As the figure shows, the user-provided altitude from earlier is carried down, and 
once combined with a degrees off-nadir value to produce a slant range distance, a data 
rate can be calculated for a small satellite angled in that matter. While this section may be 
useful in some cases, it was deemed far less important than data rate achieved at nadir 
because it was believed that a space acquisition professional would be primarily 
concerned with a data rate achieved at nadir. For this reason, the off-nadir SATCOM 
pointing section was not used in the final draft of either decision support tool. 
The final section of the MILSATCOM payload worksheet was the half-power 
beamwidth, which determined gain and bandwidth available at the edge of the satellite’s 
beam rather than down its bore sight. Figure 25 shows the half-power beamwidth section. 
Figure 25.  Half-power Beamwidth 
 
 
As the figure shows, the only input used was the satellite’s antenna diameter, 
which was carried down from an earlier cell filled out by the user. The antenna diameter 
was used to calculate the base power gain of the satellite, which was used to calculate the 
half-power gain after being converted to decibels. After subtracting three decibels of loss 
at the edge of the beam, the gain was converted back to its unit-less value and used to 
calculate the data rate available at the edge of the satellite’s beam using the link budget 
equation. 
The MILSATCOM payload worksheet captured information deemed significant 
to a space acquisition professional who was beginning a feasibility analysis of a small 
MILSATCOM satellite. As shown, accepted space design and physics equations were 
used to produce estimated output responses based on the user’s inputs. Similar to the ISR 
payload worksheet, the MILSATCOM worksheet’s simplicity and ease of use make it an 
optimal tool for addressing early conceptual design. While both worksheets addressed 
design considerations for specific payload subsystems, they did not consider common 
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subsystem design factors, which have a large impact on the overall satellite functionality. 
The following satellite bus worksheets were developed to address those factors. 
3. Synthesis Model: Satellite Bus Worksheets 
This thesis looked at two different mission payloads, ISR and MILSATCOM. 
Each payload had its own characteristics and needs that did not relate to the other and 
thus were separated into two different worksheets. However, both payloads would share 
similar satellite bus designs, therefore worksheets were designed based on common 
satellite bus features. The following three worksheets account for the shared satellite bus 
features and were developed for the tool. 
a. Mass and Size Worksheet 
Figure 26 shows the preliminary spacecraft mass section of the mass and size 
worksheet. This section calculates the payload mass and the mass of the major 
subsystems based on a desired spacecraft mass submitted by the user. The subsystem 
masses were calculated based on the averages for light satellites listed in SMAD’s 
Appendix A (Wertz and Larson 2010, 896). 
Figure 26.  Preliminary Spacecraft Mass 
 
 
As the figure shows, the user is asked to input the desired mass of the proposed 
small satellite. The desired mass was then used to calculate estimated subsystem masses 
using average subsystem percentages taken from SMAD. This section also allows the 
user to decide whether to include propellant to enhance the satellite’s performance. The 
inclusion of propellant required a modification to the original percentages used to 
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calculate the subsystem masses and was calculated as 28.9% of the satellite’s total mass 
on average when included based on the average propellant mass of light satellites from 
SMAD’s Appendix A (Wertz and Larson 2010, 895). The summation of all these 
subsystem masses produced the total spacecraft weighted mass as an output. Based on 
Chapter III, the key input factors in this section are desired spacecraft mass and the 
inclusion of propellant, and the key output responses  are calculated payload mass and 
spacecraft weighted mass. 
The mass and size worksheet also calculated some spacecraft preliminary sizing 
data, which can be seen in Figure 27. This section calculates a minimum, maximum, and 
expected value for the satellite’s volume, body area, and linear dimension based on the 
satellite’s weighted mass. 
Figure 27.  Preliminary Spacecraft Sizing 
 
 
As the figure shows, all of the sizing values are calculated based on user inputs 
from previous sections and the sizing equations in SMAD (Wertz and Larson 2010, 337). 
Volume and body area were also included as additional information for future users, but 
ultimately determined to be too detailed for the purposes of this thesis. The most 
important of the six sizing calculations with regards to the synthesis model was the 
expected linear dimension, which presented an accurate predication for the satellite’s 
length and width based on the satellite’s mass. This key output response was important 
because it was a primary factor used to determine a launch vehicle’s ability to carry the 
satellite. 
b. Orbital Period/Revisit Time Worksheet 
The next worksheet was the orbital period/revisit time worksheet. The purpose of 
this worksheet was to determine the satellite’s period and revisit time, which are critical 
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in determining the satellite’s access to a particular location for capturing imagery or 
providing communications. This section produced two output responses based on user 
inputs from previous worksheets: number of accesses in 30 days and the mean duration of 
a single access. Unlike the other worksheets, the relationship between the inputs and 
outputs in this section were based on data from an STK simulation, which used a satellite 
orbit scenario to provide organized data more quickly than if the calculations were 
completed by hand. To minimize variance, all the STK scenarios were set for 30 days, 
which provided a reliable number of data points without requiring STK to spend hours 
calculating results. 
Each scenario contained a satellite at a defined sun-synchronous orbit in 
increments of 100 kilometers. A variety of cone half angle options were defined for each 
satellite scenario; the cone half angles were defined as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 
40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, and 75 degrees, respectively. Cone half angle directly affects 
the width of FOR. A wider cone half angle will produce a wider FOR, allowing for a 
larger area of potential access, and potentially better revisit times. The STK-generated 
30-day access reports for each satellite altitude and cone half-angle combination, and the 
number of accesses achieved during the scenario timeline and the mean access duration 
in seconds were recorded. All of these data points were entered into JMP, which 
produced meta-model equations for the two output responses. The meta-model equations 
were then placed into the MS Excel tool under the orbital period/revisit time worksheet 
and used to calculate the number of accesses in 30 days and the mean access duration. 
Figure 28 shows the orbital period/revisit time section.   
Figure 28.  Orbital Period/Revisit Time 
 
 
As the figure shows, the number of accesses in 30 days and mean access duration 
are reliant on only two inputs: altitude and cone half-angle. While both of those inputs 
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were determined to be key input factors, the cells for altitude and cone half-angle are 
green because the values are taken from an earlier worksheet that requests those same 
inputs from the user. The two output responses, number of accesses in 30 days and mean 
access duration, were determined to be key output responses because of their effect on 
satellite mission effectiveness. 
c. Cost Worksheet 
The development of the cost worksheet was divided into two tasks: 1) 
determining the cheapest launch vehicle available that could carry the satellite and then 
estimating the price of that launch vehicle, and 2) calculating an estimated program cost 
for a single satellite based on user inputs. Those two estimations are added together to 
produce the total estimated cost per satellite. Figure 29 provides a screenshot of a portion 
of the cost worksheet.   
Figure 29.  Cost 
 
Adapted from: (Orbital Sciences 2007; SpaceX 2015; United Launch Alliance 2010; United 
Launch Alliance 2013). 
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As the figure illustrates, the majority of the input fields are carried over from 
earlier worksheets. The two yellow fields are new and represent the desired inclination 
and the number of satellites to be launched at one time. These inputs drove the 
calculations seen in the center of the worksheet and were used to calculate the build costs 
of a small satellite as well as launch vehicle cost. The equations used to calculate the cost 
of building a single satellite came from the newest edition of “Space Mission 
Engineering: The New SMAD” and depended on the calculated payload mass from the 
mass and size section. (Wertz, Everett, and Puschell 2011, 300–301). This included 
equations for calculating the individual costs of bus development, payload development, 
integration, assembly, and testing (IA&T), and program level costs which include factors 
like systems engineering, program management, and software development. The sum of 
these costs represents the estimated cost to build a single satellite, which was multiplied 
by the number of satellites. This assumes no savings from efficiencies gained from 
building multiple satellites. 
The bottom of the cost worksheet is a launch vehicle selection matrix 
programmed to highlight launch vehicles that meet the user input parameters in bright 
green. The lowest cost from the highlighted options is added to the calculated satellite 
build costs to determine the total estimated cost of building and launching the small 
satellite (highlighted in orange). This thesis assumed that the user would want the 
cheapest feasible launch vehicle, but the user has the option to scroll through the launch 
vehicle matrix and choose his/her own launch vehicle and its associated cost. 
Determining the cheapest launch vehicle and the price of that launch vehicle began with 
research on available launch vehicles. Particular attention was paid to any launch vehicles 
and companies that had been previously used by the DOD and/or the U.S. government 
because this indicated a successful, working relationship between the DOD and the 
contracted launch company. 
The research of this thesis also focused on smaller launch vehicles for two 
reasons. First, the thesis is focused on small satellites versus large ones. Second, it was 
assumed that smaller launch vehicles would be cheaper than larger ones, and using 
smaller launch vehicles prevents potentially wasting space due to small satellites filling 
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more of the available space in the fairing. Thesis research into the current launch vehicle 
market discovered only a few smaller launch vehicle options that had been proven 
through operational use and had literature on vehicle specifications and capabilities. DOD 
launch vehicle programs such as Super Strypi and the Soldier-Warfighter Operationally 
Responsive Deployer for Space (SWORDS) were researched, but ultimately left off the 
model because they were still unproven R&D programs and no cost data were available. 
Once cost data is available, these launch vehicles should be added because they will 
provide a significant cost savings over the current available launch vehicles. 
Ultimately, four launch vehicles were chosen: Orbital ATK’s Pegasus XL rocket, 
SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket, United Launch Alliance’s (ULA) Atlas V 401 rocket, and the 
ULA Delta IV Medium rocket. Launch-relevant information for each launch vehicle 
option was recorded, including payload fairing height, payload fairing diameter, usable 
mass allowance, altitudes used, inclinations used, and listed cost. The rocket parameters 
were taken from each launch vehicle’s user guide, provided by the respective company’s 
online websites. The resultant table provided over 200 variations across the four launch 
vehicles, dependent on the desired satellite mass, size, orbit altitude, and inclination. 
Together, the mass and size, orbital period/revisit time, and cost worksheets 
represented design factors that were common to any small satellite design, regardless of 
the payload. Each worksheet examined aspects of a small satellite bus that are important 
to a space acquisition professional based on this research and the outcomes of previous 
thesis chapters. The key input factors and output responses highlighted in these 
worksheets as well as the payload-specific worksheets were determined to be significant 
and would be used in the DOE and assist in the production of the synthesis model. 
C. DOE 
Once the MS Excel tool was completed, it was sent to the NPS SEED Center for 
Data Farming, a research center within NPS that is researching how decision makers can 
use M&S effectively to assist in their decisions and subsequent policies (Simulation 
Experiments & Efficient Design Center for Data Farming 2016). Mary McDonald, a 
faculty associate in the Operations Research Department, used a 2nd Order Nearly 
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Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design tool developed by Alex MacCalman to 
build the DOE. Figure 30 shows a screen shot of the ISR factors and responses used in 
the design. 
Figure 30.  ISR Factors-Responses Macro 
 
 
As the figure shows, the “Factors” section at the top left of the worksheet lists the 
eight ISR key factors, and the cells of the MS Excel tool from which those inputs were 
originally displayed (highlighted in yellow). The seven desired output responses were 
listed in the “Responses” section, with the cells of the MS Excel tool from which those 
calculated outputs were originally displayed highlighted in orange. The bottom of the 
worksheet displays the minimum and maximum values for each of the input factors for 
use in building the DOE. Based on those settings, McDonald built a 465-point 2nd order 
NOLH design with a pairwise correlation, which would ensure limited 1st and 2nd order 
confounding. Using this design, McDonald created a macro in the MS Excel spreadsheet 
that executed the DOE within the model directly, and recorded the output responses 




Figure 31.  Partial DOE Output Table 
 
 
As the figure shows, for each set of input factors there is a corresponding set of 
output responses highlighted in orange. Since some combinations of the input values 
might produce an infeasible design, some of the output response values came out as 
negative values, highlighted in red. Despite producing some infeasible small satellite 
design outputs, the output response values were tied to the original input factors, so meta-
models could still be developed that would preserve the relationship between the inputs 
and outputs. These meta-models would allow for a deeper exploration of the relationships 
between the factors and responses. 
To develop these meta-models, the data table was exported into JMP in order to 
explore the relationship between input factors and output responses in more depth. The 
JMP software is a program comprised of multiple statistical tools designed to provide 
data analysis with a visual medium such as interactive graphs and charts (SAS 2016b). 
Paul Beery used JMP to develop his meta-models used to drive his “dashboard,” which 
he used to visualize the trade space for his operational and physical synthesis models. 
This thesis sought to use JMP for the same purpose. 
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D. DEVELOPING THE JMP TOOL 
The JMP program was used to explore the relationship between the input factors 
and output responses from the DOE data produced by Mary McDonald’s macro. The 
output data from the DOE provided hundreds of data points, presenting an opportunity to 
discover how certain factors influence certain responses. JMP’s statistical functions 
correlate the factors and the responses based on the type of regression analysis the user 
wants to conduct. Initial regression analysis used seven output responses and eight input 
factors, as well as their higher order interactions using second-degree factorial and 
second-degree polynomial relationships. The standard least squares estimate method was 
initially used for data screening, which JMP applied to each of the seven responses 
individually. For the purposes of this thesis, the output response “total cost” will be used 
to illustrate the products created by the JMP software, although similar analysis was done 
for all seven responses. The resultant statistical products include a predicted plot showing 
the fit of the model to the data points, a summary of fit reporting the R-squared value, 
sorted parameter estimates showing the amount of influence each input factor had on the 
overall model, and a predicted expression, which is the meta-model that used all the input 
factors as well as the factorial and polynomial relationships up to the second degree. 
Figure 32 shows some of these initial regression analysis products for total cost. 
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Figure 32.  Initial Regression Analysis Products for Total Cost 
 
 
As the figure shows, the R-squared value, also known as the “coefficient of 
determination” in statistics, was 0.995735, indicating a near-perfect fit of the data to the 
model. This is not surprising considering how many input factors (including the second 
degree relationships) were used to build the model as well as the deterministic nature of 
mathematical models. Under the “sorted parameter estimates” section, the chart shows 
only six of the 40 possible interactions (highlighted in orange) that were significant and 
responsible for the majority of the effects on total cost. All seven output responses 
showed similar results; their behaviors were primarily affected by six or fewer input 
interactions. As a result, the next step sought to simplify the regression analysis by 
removing all the insignificant factors that had minimal influence on the output response. 
For ease of analysis, each of the seven output responses were run individually. 
The first analysis used stepwise regression to simplify the model by identifying the 
factors that had the greatest influence on the response. Figure 33 shows the stepwise 
regression analysis for total cost. 
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Figure 33.  Stepwise Regression Analysis for Total Cost 
 
 
As the figure shows, the stepwise regression identified six interactions that were 
considered significant and most influenced the total cost output response. This included 
the primary input factors of mass, inclination, and number of satellites as well as the 
second-degree factorial relationship between mass and the number of satellites, and the 
second-degree polynomial relationship between mass and itself, and inclination and itself. 
Following this screening, secondary analysis returned to least squares estimate regression 
to analyze only the six interactions identified by stepwise analysis rather than using all 
eight input factors and the additional second-degree factors. This produced a more 




Figure 34.  Refined Regression Model for Total Cost 
 
 
As the figure shows, the R-squared value dropped from 0.995735 to 0.995543, a 
marginal decrease when considering the reduction in complexity from 40 input 
interactions to just six, proving that the six input interactions identified by stepwise 
regression analysis were indeed responsible for nearly all of the effects on the model. The 
“sorted parameter estimates” section shows all six input interactions highlighted in 
orange, indicating their importance to the model. The key product from this analysis 
report is the prediction expression, which is the meta-model that is used to calculate the 
total cost output response based on the user-submitted values for the relevant input 
factors. The initial least squares regression analysis, which included over 40 input 
interactions, yielded a prediction expression that was dozens of lines long. The refined 
prediction expression for total cost, shown in Figure 34, only requires input values for 
mass, inclination, and the number of satellites, making the prediction expression much 
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simpler while still maintaining a near-perfect fit. The refined meta-models for each of the 
seven output responses were then reinserted into the final, stream-lined iteration of the 
MS Excel tool (named the “trade space analysis worksheet”), completing the tool and 
making it ready to provide decision support to DOD space acquisition professionals. 
E. FINALIZING THE DECISION SUPPORT TOOLS 
The initial MS Excel tool introduced earlier in this chapter served two purposes. 
The first was to develop a functional tool that would accurately calculate design 
responses based on user-selected values for a variety of input factors. The second purpose 
of the initial MS Excel tool was to produce output data through the execution of a DOE 
for use in statistical analysis and meta-model development. The data produced by Mary 
McDonald and then analyzed in JMP resulted in refined meta-model equations for each 
of the seven key output responses that produced very precise fits (over 90% for all output 
responses). The model equations provided an opportunity to streamline the MS Excel tool 
even further into the trade space analysis worksheet, which is shown in Figure 35. 




As the trade space analysis worksheet shows, the only inputs required are the 
seven key input factors that influenced the seven key output responses identified at the 
end of chapter three. The only key input factor that was not included in the final trade 
space analysis worksheet was FOV diameter due to the oversight previously mentioned. 
A user can now use this worksheet for quick feasibility analysis of potential small 
satellite designs by inputting values for the seven inputs without needing to search 
through the earlier worksheets or using JMP. A trade space analysis worksheet was 
produced for both the ISR and MILSATCOM payloads, which are very similar. If the 
user is interested in other variables that are not included on this worksheet, he/she can 
choose to use the earlier worksheets of the MS Excel tool that include those additional 
variables. 
While the trade space analysis worksheet provides a faster and simpler analysis 
tool for examining the relationship between key inputs and outputs, it is still limited in 
the support it provides because it does not possess a visual component. As discussed 
earlier, a visual component adds another layer of understanding to the information being 
presented. While the trade space analysis worksheet presents estimated values for the key 
output responses, it does not tell the user how much “wiggle” room he/she has in the 
design. Adding a visual component to the decision support tools enhances the 
understanding of the user by providing an additional dimension to explore. That 
information can be important to a DOD space acquisitions professional who may be 
interested in how much margin is available for trade-offs in each of the input responses, 
especially during the early portions of conceptual design. Unfortunately, MS Excel did 
not possess a graphical function capable of displaying the desired visual so this thesis 
used the JMP contour profiler as a supplemental tool to help visualize the trade space of a 
small satellite. JMP provided an interactive contour plot that would respond and change 
its display features based on user inputs. The visuals of the JMP program used in 
combination with the trade space analysis worksheet provide different analysis options 
for a decision maker to use during satellite conceptual design. The contour profiler 
provides a reactive graph that responds to changes in input factor values carried over by 
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the user from the trade space analysis worksheet. Figure 36 shows a screen shot of the 
contour profiler. 
Figure 36.  Contour Profiler 
 
 
As the figure shows, there are three sections to the contour profiler: the input 
section at the top, the response limits section in the middle, and the profiler graph at the 
bottom. The input section at the top lists the eight key input factors determined in chapter 
three, including FOV diameter, which was excluded on the trade space analysis 
worksheet. The user should take the input values from the trade space analysis worksheet 
and enter these values in the appropriate box under the “Current X” column. This 
provides a foundational starting point for exploring the trade space of a feasible small 
satellite design. One limitation of JMP is that it can only display two input factors at a 
time, represented by the “Horiz” and “Vert” columns in the input section. The user will 
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have to jump between factors while exploring the trade space of the small satellite to gain 
more insight. 
The response limits section is where the user can set the lower and upper limits of 
the output responses in the “Lo Limit” and “Hi Limit,” respectively. These limits set the 
shaded areas of the profiler graph based on the values submitted in the input section. The 
user can choose to set both lower and upper limits based on their needs, but it’s more 
likely that one or the other will be set for each output response. For example, the user will 
want the lightest feasible satellite possible, and thus will set a maximum limit for 
spacecraft weighted mass. Conversely, the user will want as many accesses in 30 days as 
possible, but may not want any less than 30 accesses during that time frame. Therefore, 
the user would set a minimum limit for number of accesses in 30 days. The “Current Y” 
column represents the current value for each of the output responses based on the input 
factor values submitted by the user in the input section. This is similar to the calculations 
provided by the trade space analysis worksheet. 
Finally, the profiler graph at the bottom provides the visual element of the trade 
space analysis worksheet. The x-axis and y-axis are set based on the input factors 
selected under the “Horiz” and “Vert” columns in the input section. The values submitted 
for the two input factors being explored produce the black, intersecting lines seen in 
Figure 36, and represent where your design sits in the trade space. If the crosshair sits in a 
white area, the values that were selected for all inputs and the constraints set in response 
limits section generate a feasible synthesis design option. The entire white area, no matter 
how small or large, represents trade space for a feasible small satellite design. If the 
crosshair falls into a colored, shaded area, the design is not feasible due to an input 
setting or constraint of at least one output response. Each output response is represented 
by a specific color that appears on the profiler graph. For example, the output response 
“calculated aperture diameter” is pink, as shown in Figure 36. While the black crosshair 
currently sits in a white area, if desired altitude was increased, the calculated aperture 
diameter would increase, eventually moving the crosshair into the pink “calculated 
aperture diameter” area of infeasibility. To alleviate infeasibility, the user must modify 
either the input factors or the limits of calculated aperture diameter. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Despite some limitations, JMP’s contour profiler provides a powerful tool for 
exploring the trade space of a small satellite design, presenting both a numerical and a 
visual component. The contour profiler and the interpretation of its results are not easily 
intuitive, but practice and understanding of how to manipulate the profiler settings will 
allow a user to see how a small satellite design can be modified and trade-offs made, 
while still maintaining feasibility. When the trade space analysis worksheet is used in 
concert with the JMP contour profiler (referred to hereafter as the “trade space 
exploration tool”), they provide decision support tools for a DOD space acquisition 
professional, allowing him/her to not only determine feasibility of a conceptual small 
satellite design but also to explore the design’s trade space and where trade-offs can be 
made. The next chapter will present an example of how the DOD may apply these tools 
by using them in a fictional stakeholder scenario. 
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V. SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
Chapter IV presented a detailed discussion of the two decision-support tools 
developed in this thesis, but it may still be difficult to understand the usability of the tools 
without applying it to an example scenario. This thesis did not approach or consult with 
any DOD stakeholders to test the usability of the decision support tools but conducted 
testing through a simulated scenario created by the author based on his professional 
military space knowledge and experience. This chapter will demonstrate the application 
of the trade space analysis worksheet and the trade space exploration tool. This chapter 
will discuss the test case scenario used, which was based on an informed yet fictitious 
account of real-world DOD stakeholders and their needs, and provide a step-by-step 
demonstration of using the tools in that scenario. 
A. TEST SCENARIO 
The scenario developed for this chapter is fictional and should not be mistaken as 
an authentic request from any DOD command or personnel. However, this scenario is 
informed by the author’s experience as a U.S. military space professional. The following 
scenario is inspired in part by the DOD’s concerns of China’s expanding counter-space 
capabilities as introduced in Chapters I and II. 
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) J5 planners are developing plans to retake 
control of the Spratly Islands from China in the event of a conflict in that area of 
responsibility (AOR). Over the past year, the commander of USPACOM has been 
receiving reports detailing China’s ASAT capabilities, particularly their direct ascent 
weapons systems. The commander of USPACOM understands that satellites are a 
significant force enhancement capability needed for executing operations, but has 
concerns about the potential of China taking out critical ISR satellites early in a potential 
conflict. He has tasked USPACOM J3 and the space operations professionals to explore 
the feasibility of potential solutions to the threat before formally requesting the capability 
on his integrated priority list (IPL). One course of action (COA) involves developing ISR 
small satellites that may be resilient against the direct ascent ASAT threat while still 
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providing acceptable capabilities. USPACOM J3 has reached out to SPAWAR’s 
Program Executive Office (PEO) for Space Systems to conduct a preliminary design 
feasibility analysis based on PACOM’s stated requirements. USPACOM J3’s 
requirements are a mixture of mission requirements and system requirements. 
 PACOM J3 needs to image objects of interest in the Spratly Islands AOR. 
This may include but is not limited to Chinese maritime vessels, ground-
based systems, and infrastructure. 
 PACOM J3 suggested a resolution of at least one meter, but is willing to 
trade this off for other capabilities. 
 PACOM J3 recommends using LEO orbit to support resolution and also 
minimize launch costs. 
 While PACOM J3 is interested in small satellites, it has no specific mass 
or size dimensions that need to be met; though they believe smaller is 
better. 
 PACOM J3 needs to collect ISR of activity in the Spratly Islands area of 
operations (AO) at least once a day, though more access is preferred. 
 PACOM J3 understands that this is an initial investigation on feasibility, 
therefore the focus will be on a single small satellite design though a 
constellation will likely be needed to achieve better access and revisit 
times to the Spratly Islands AO. 
 PACOM J3 did not present a budget constraint since this is only a 
preliminary analysis, but it is interested in an estimated cost with the 
intent of minimizing the program’s cost. A lower cost may help in the 
DOD’s approval of the program if the small satellite is selected as a 
solution. 
This fictional scenario will guide a demonstration of the trade space analysis 
worksheet and the trade space exploration tool developed by this thesis. For this scenario, 
it is assumed that any administrative tasks or obstacles that may arise in the real world 
have been overcome so that analysis can focus solely on the feasibility of a proposed 
small satellite design. While these tools and the subsequent analysis are intended to be 
used by space acquisition professionals who may work for a command similar to 
SPAWAR PEO Space Systems, the discussion in this chapter will be from the 
perspective of the author rather than a space acquisition professional. 
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B. USING THE TOOLS 
Discussions with USPACOM J3 produced both broad and contextualized 
requirements that provide a foundation for analysis. The major requirements as 
understood include: 
 One-meter resolution to image 
 LEO orbit 
 “Small” satellite 
 Access to Spratly Islands AO per day 
 Lowest cost possible 
These requirements spark a few initial considerations and assumptions at the 
beginning of the feasibility analysis. First is that an imaging small satellite is desired for 
deployment in LEO orbit. While it was not specified, it is assumed that an electro-optical 
(EO) satellite that collects imagery in the human visible spectrum is desired. Since an EO 
satellite is desired, it is more beneficial to design the small satellite for a sun-synchronous 
orbit. This will allow the satellite to access the region at the same time every day, 
ensuring there will always be sunlight at the time of image collection. This setting is 
subject to stakeholder preference and trade-offs because an orbital inclination closer to 
the latitude of the area of interest can produce better revisit times and may be better 
suited for the mission requirements. LEO altitudes are still achievable from a sun-
synchronous inclination, but the differences between the assumed circular LEO and a 
sun-synchronous orbit must be understood. 
Second, altitude was set to 200 kilometers for this initial assessment with the 
intent of maintaining as low an altitude as possible to support resolution and minimize 
launch costs. Third, cone half-angle (i.e., FOR angle) was set to 20 degrees, which is a 
common value for imaging satellites. Fourth, the stakeholder did not provide an exact 
mass or size requirement, only the general term “small.” This analysis will define “small” 
to be a mass under 100 kilograms based on assumptions of the stakeholder’s intent for 
and needs of the satellite. The addition of propellant was selected to maximize mission 
flexibility, but this will also maximize the spacecraft’s weighted mass during initial 
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assessment, though that option can be removed in the future. Fifth, the stakeholder 
requires access (i.e., imaging) of the area at least once a day, however, the stakeholder 
did not specify the length of time needed. This analysis will assume a mean access time 
of one to two minutes is desired, which should be enough time for the small satellite to 
capture sufficient ISR data. Finally, the stakeholder understands that this initial analysis 
will only consider a single small satellite, but knowing that a constellation is likely 
desired, cost analysis will consider multiple small satellites. This analysis used a 
constellation of six satellites, but they factor only into cost and not performance of the 
small satellite system. 
After accounting for the stakeholder’s requirements and the subsequent associated 
considerations, these inputs were entered into the trade space analysis worksheet. Figure 
37 shows the application of the stakeholder’s requirements with the aforementioned 
considerations. 




As the trade space analysis worksheet shows, the resultant output values are not 
surprising and are consistent with the parameters of small satellites researched earlier in 
this thesis, given the input values. The estimated cost of the six satellites is under $124 
million, which includes the cost of the launch vehicle. Based on the desired mass, the 
satellite will be just over one meter long. Initial analysis indicates the outputs that warrant 
further exploration for potential trade-offs are the number of accesses in 30 days and the 
mean access duration. The current estimation predicts just four visits to a particular area 
of interest in a single month with each visit being just under 18 seconds long. This adds 
up to approximately 71 seconds of access to an area of interest in a 30-day timespan. This 
is a concern even when multiplied by six satellites because it is far less than the 
stakeholder requested and needs to be addressed. Thus, the analysis will now move to the 
trade space exploration tool to see if trade-offs can be made to improve the number of 
accesses in 30 days and the mean access duration while meeting the rest of the 
requirements. 
The input values from the trade space analysis worksheet are then entered into the 
trade space exploration tool. FOV diameter, an input factor not included on the trade 
space analysis worksheet, was set to 20 kilometers based on common values for ISR 
satellites. The upper (‘Hi Limit’) and lower (‘Lo Limit’) bounds in the response section 
were chosen based on either stated stakeholder requirements, assumptions based on their 
needs and intentions, and/or military experience. A maximum aperture diameter of 25 
centimeters, a maximum payload mass of 50 kilograms and a maximum spacecraft 
weighted mass of 100 kilograms, and a maximum linear dimension of 1.5 meters all serve 
to keep the satellite relatively small as requested by the stakeholder. The minimum values 
for number of accesses and mean access duration were based on the stakeholder’s access 
requirement. The total cost limit was set to a maximum of $100 million based on 
knowledge of costs for larger DOD satellite programs, which are more expensive, as 
described in Chapters I and II. Figure 38 shows the output of the trade space exploration 
tool after entering the initial inputs from the trade space analysis worksheet. 
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Figure 38.  Scenario Trade Space Exploration Tool Initial Input 
 
 
As the figure shows, both the response limits section and the profiler graph show 
that the initial small satellite design is infeasible. The response values under the “Current 
Y” column show five out of seven of the output responses are infeasible and outside 
either the upper or lower limits set based on the stakeholder’s requirements. The output 
responses limiting feasibility are calculated aperture diameter, spacecraft weighted mass, 
number of accesses in 30 days, mean access duration, and total cost. Thus, modifications 
must be made to the input factor values or the upper and lower limits in order to produce 
a feasible small satellite design. To do this, the mass value will be modified first because 
of its direct relationship to spacecraft weighted mass and total cost. Figure 39 shows the 




Figure 39.  Scenario Trade Space Exploration Tool with Mass Reduced 
 
 
As the figure shows, by reducing the input mass from 100 kilograms to 50 
kilograms, the spacecraft weighted mass dropped from 129 to 64.5 kilograms and the 
total cost dropped from approximately $130 million to $81.5 million, making both of 
these output responses feasible. While these two output responses no longer limit the 
satellite’s feasibility, there are still three other output responses that are causing an 
infeasible design, as can be seen on the profiler graph. The black crosshair on the profiler 
graph shifted outside of the shaded regions of the spacecraft weighted mass and total 
cost, but the black crosshair is still located in a region of infeasibility, necessitating 
further modifications to the small satellite’s input factor values or limits. The output 
responses still preventing feasibility are calculated aperture diameter, number of accesses 
in 30 days, and mean access duration. To modify these responses, a change is required in 
either desired resolution, altitude, FOR angle, and/or FOV diameter because those are the 
input factors that affect the limiting output responses. While a resolution of one meter 
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was initially desired, relaxing that requirement could produce increased feasibility of 
design, as shown in Figure 40.  
Figure 40.  Scenario Trade Space Exploration Tool with Decreased Resolution 
 
 
As the figure shows, by decreasing the desired resolution from one meter to two 
meters, the number of output responses causing infeasibility decreased from three to two. 
While two meters is not as precise, it still allows detection of targets of interest like 
Chinese naval vessels or aircraft operating near the Spratly Islands, thus can be a 
legitimate trade-off for feasibility. This modification produced another shift in the black 
crosshair out of the calculated aperture diameter’s shaded area (pink), indicating the 
calculated aperture diameter value is now feasible within the stakeholder’s limit. 
However, the current small satellite design remains infeasible, still limited by the number 
of accesses in 30 days and the mean access duration. The two input factors that most 
affect the number of accesses and the mean access duration are spacecraft altitude and the 
cone half-angle, listed as FOR angle in the trade space exploration tool. In order to 
 93
produce a feasible small satellite design, those two input factors need to be modified. The 
results of those changes are shown in Figure 41. 
Figure 41.  Scenario Trade Space Exploration Tool  
with Increased Altitude and FOR Angle 
 
 
As the figure shows, by increasing altitude from 200 kilometers to 400 kilometers 
and the FOR angle from 20 degrees to 45 degrees, a feasible solution is achieved. While 
the black crosshair did not move since mass and resolution were not modified, the shaded 
areas of infeasibility for the number of accesses and the mean access duration shrank. As 
the profiler graph shows, the black crosshair is now located in a non-shaded, white area, 
which represents the area of feasible design and potential further design trade-offs. The 
white strip above the crosshair indicates margin for the desired mass input factor. The 
spacecraft weighted mass value is 64.5 kilograms, which is 35.5 kilograms under the 100-
kilogram stakeholder limit, providing feasible trade space for the desired mass of the 
small satellite. The trade space for desired resolution is not as generous. The black 
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crosshair is on the right-most edge of the calculated aperture diameter response’s shaded 
area. The calculated aperture diameter’s value is 24.83 centimeters, just barely under the 
set limit of 25 centimeters, making improved resolution impossible under the current 
limits and inputs. The white space to the right of the black crosshair indicates a large 
amount of flexibility in the positive x-axis direction, but further decrease in resolution is 
not a desired trade off. 
Thus, far, this analysis has only explored the visual responses based on the 
desired mass and resolution input factors. Changing the selected input factors under the 
“horiz” and “vert” columns can provide more in-depth analysis on the effects of other 
input factors, which is dependent on the needs and priority of the user. To give an 
example, Figure 42 shows the trade space exploration tool looking at the desired 
resolution and altitude input factors instead of desired resolution and mass. 
Figure 42.  Scenario Trade Space Exploration Tool  




As the figure shows, the values in the response limits section did not change 
because no changes were made to the values of the input factors. However, the profiler 
graph contours changed due to the switch from desired mass to desired altitude along the 
y-axis. The calculated aperture diameter region now has a curved edge rather than a 
linear edge and engulfs more of the graph space, indicating the output response’s more 
robust relationship with desired altitude compared to desired mass. Despite the change in 
contour, the small satellite design is still feasible. While the black crosshairs are again 
just outside the limits of the calculated aperture diameter, there is more margin in the 
trade space for these two input factors, providing an opportunity to increase the satellite’s 
altitude and decrease its resolution, though both of those changes are likely undesirable. 
Based on the findings of this initial analysis, SPAWAR PEO Space Systems 
should inform the PACOM J3 that if it is willing to reduce its desired ground resolution 
from one meter to two meters, a feasible design is possible that meets PACOM’s other 
mission requirements. PACOM J3 did not provide any other specific requirements that 
could not be met by the trade-offs made during analysis, thus SPAWAR can offer a 
feasible small satellite design based on the input values. Ultimately, it is up to PACOM to 
decide whether or not the design input values are acceptable and whether or not to fund 
the requirement as an IPL, but PACOM now has estimates for a feasible small satellite 
design that it can choose to explore in further detail. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this chapter was to demonstrate the usability and functionality of the 
trade space analysis worksheet and the trade space exploration tool developed by this 
thesis in a simulated scenario. The scenario offered a hypothetical set of space 
requirements and design considerations that a DOD command may request, and produced 
insight into how the tools may be used to support an initial feasibility assessment. The 
tools provide a method for assessing system feasibility and analysis and present 
compelling data that can be used in judging the design value of potential small satellites. 
By quantitatively and graphically describing the relationship between user inputs and 
output responses, the tools allow a user to explore potential small satellite design in much 
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more depth and consider the potential trade-offs that can be made in order to achieve a 
feasible design. The tools are designed to be used in early conceptual design to assess 
feasibility and are not designed to provide concrete design specifications and parameters. 
These tools provide an opportunity to explore the design trade space of a proposed small 
satellite that can provide insight for stakeholders, acquisitions professionals, and 
engineers to design considerations that may save all parties money, time, and effort down 
the road. This thesis presented evidence that MBSE may be used to help assess some of 
the DOD’s space acquisition problems. By building and applying a physical synthesis 
model that can assess the feasibility of a small satellite design, the tools included in this 
thesis provided an initial operating capability for decision makers that can have an 
immediate impact, but also have the potential to be refined and enhanced further by 
future work. 
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VI. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reviews the problem introduced in chapter one and discuss how this 
thesis sought to solve that problem. This chapter discusses areas of potential follow-on 
work. Specifically, recommendations will be made with regard to pertinent areas to 
explore further and questions that were not addressed by this thesis so that future 
researchers may expand and enhance this research. In addition, this chapter reviews the 
key ideas, themes, and conclusions that emerged as a result of this work, summarizing the 
contributions this thesis made to research on DOD small satellites.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON WORK 
Due to the limited amount of time and resources available, the goals of this thesis 
were significantly constrained. As such, this thesis was unable to explore all the relevant 
research areas or produce decision support tools beyond an initial proof of concept. 
Despite these limitations, the following areas of concern are important to the 
improvement of the research and are recommended as areas of future work. 
1. Increase the Number of Key Factors Analyzed 
This thesis applied the systems engineering process to screen the number of key 
factors included in the model to eight input factors and seven output responses. This was 
done to simplify model development, DOE, and analysis. By increasing the number of 
key factors included, the model may offer more accurate analysis on the relationship 
between inputs and outputs and on the trade space of the small satellite design. However, 
it should be cautioned that increasing the number of key factors used may also make the 
tool too cumbersome to use by a DOD space acquisition professional, as seen in the 
SMAD worksheet. Future work can strive to find an appropriate balance between 
accurate information and ease of use. 
2. Refining the Data Used in Models 
In addition to minimizing the number of key input factors and output responses 
used to build the model, assumptions and constraints were applied to some of the data 
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used to build the meta-models. One example of this was the use of an STK simulation to 
gather data and build the meta-models for the number of accesses in 30 days and the 
mean access duration. While a range of altitudes and cone half-angles were used in the 
STK simulation, the inclination remained the same (98 degrees/sun-synchronous). This 
restricted the meta-models for the output responses to be dependent on only two factors, 
altitude and cone half-angle. In future work, the STK scenario can be improved to include 
a range of values for inclination, providing more robust data and thus more robust meta-
models for the number of accesses in 30 days and the mean access duration. More robust 
models can improve the quality of the analysis performed by the trade space analysis 
worksheet and the trade space exploration tool. 
3. More Data on Launch Vehicles 
Due to time constraints and the state of current small launch vehicle R&D, this 
thesis primarily focused research on active launch vehicles with an established record of 
launching DOD systems. While that research provided an accurate snapshot of the launch 
vehicle services currently available, it does not address the movement toward smaller and 
more affordable launch vehicles like Super Strypi and SWORDS. Considering this 
thesis’s focus on the disaggregation of large satellites in favor of constellations of small 
satellites, the development and emergence of small launch vehicles is an important area 
of future research. 
4. Other Emerging Space Capabilities 
This thesis focused on small satellites as a system solution to the DOD’s problem, 
but small satellites are one of many alternatives. Another alternative is high altitude 
airships that were briefly discussed in Chapter II. The steps performed in this thesis and 
the decision support tools developed can easily be adapted to account for HAAS to better 
inform the DOD space community of its potential as an option. 
5. Refining the DOE 
The DOE macro used produced some questionable values for the key input factors 
based on the set minimum and maximum values because of low fidelity STK models, 
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which in turn affected the output response data points. The effects were minimal since 
they appeared as outliers during the statistical analysis of the model, but refining the 
DOE could produce more accurate data, especially for the cost and revisit time output 
responses, which in turn would produce more accurate models and better information 
from the analysis. 
6. Improve Usability and Functionality of the Tools 
The decision support tools developed in this thesis serve as a proof of concept to 
show that MBSE could be used beneficially to solve a spacecraft design problem. 
However, future work can strive to improve the tool by increasing and streamlining its 
functionality. For example, rather than flipping between multiple worksheets, all of those 
fields can be added to a single worksheet. The single worksheet may be capable of 
determining earlier which fields the user will need (i.e., choosing between payloads), and 
remove or hide the non-pertinent fields. In addition, it may be possible to add the visual 
component provided by the JMP program to MS Excel. JMP is not used widely, 
especially in the DOD, whereas Excel is common. Adding in a version of the contour 
profiler to Excel would make a complete tool that can be used by nearly all DOD 
commands. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The DOD relies more than ever on space-based capabilities to maintain its 
advantage in modern warfare. Satellites have been critical space force enhancement tools 
for over two decades, whose support has been particularly important in the mission areas 
of MILSATCOM and ISR collection. While the DOD’s large satellites provide a robust 
capability, they are ill designed to combat emerging threats and concerns like ASAT 
weapons and the DOD’s shrinking defense budget. If the DOD wants to maintain its 
military advantage, it must seek out innovative solutions to protecting its space-based 
capabilities. One solution is the disaggregation of large satellites in favor of 
constellations of smaller satellites. Unfortunately, small satellites are still a relatively new 
technology whose application needs further exploration before deployment, especially by 
the DOD. The DOD needs further exploration of small satellites as a potential solution to 
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emerging threats and concerns. This thesis sought to fill that need by using the SE 
process and the MBSE methodology to develop a set of decision support tools that 
provide exploration of small satellite designs early in the conceptual design phase of the 
DOD space acquisition process. 
MBSE provides a method for graphically exploring and analyzing the 
relationships between input factors and output responses. As this thesis proved, the 
MBSE methodology can be useful in feasibility analysis of nascent technology like small 
satellites by providing insightful and accurate information earlier in the acquisitions 
process. Understanding how input factors like a small satellite’s mass affect output 
responses like a the cost to build a small satellite provide DOD space acquisition 
professionals an opportunity to determine whether or not resources should be allocated to 
a small satellite design. It also provides an opportunity to further explore that relationship 
to determine if trade-offs can be made in order to achieve a feasible design. This thesis 
used early phases of the SE process to convert DOD mission requirements into key 
factors, then used MBSE to accurately relate key input factors to key output responses in 
small satellite design. The analysis of those relationships culminated into meta-models 
that can be used to predict design values for a small satellite and also explore how 
different design changes in a small satellite’s physical components may impact combat 
effectiveness. The meta-models accurately depict how changing the value of an input 
factor like desired resolution or spacecraft mass can effect change in an output response 
like cost. Information on the cause and effect relationship between design factors can 
assist in assessing feasibility of small satellite designs. Knowing the feasibility of a small 
satellite design and seeing where trade-offs can be made in its physical components can 
result in a more effective small satellite design and a more efficient space acquisition 
process. 
This thesis used the meta-models, which can be traced back to DOD small 
satellite mission requirements gather through extensive research, to build decision 
support tools to assist in the space acquisition process. The two decision support tools 
produced in this work should help fill a gap identified within the DOD. With the analysis 
and information provided by the decision support tools, DOD decision makers now have 
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a capability to conduct quick feasibility assessments on proposed small satellite designs 
very earlier in the conceptual design phase rather than discovering problems later in the 
process. By receiving the feasibility analysis earlier, decision makers may have an 
opportunity to more accurately apply resources to small satellite programs that best meet 
mission requirements. Additionally, the decision support tools can be used in conjunction 
with a utility assessment method. In the case of equally feasible designs, the two decision 
support tools can provide a means for space system design adjustments during utility 
analysis. In the long run, more informed decision-making in the space acquisition process 
might preserve valuable DOD resources that would have otherwise been wasted. This 
thesis was a proof of concept that now sets a foundation for future work. With additional 
analysis and expansion of the scope and focus, the products of this thesis can be enhanced 
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APPENDIX. REQUIREMENTS OF SMALL SATELLITE 
PROGRAMS 
Figures 43 and 44 catalog the multiple DOD small satellite programs that were 
researched in support of Chapters II and III, and their mission requirements. In some 
cases, the mission requirements found for each program were slightly different (e.g., 
some were vague while others offered a specific performance parameter), but the 
intended needs of the programs were similar enough that they could be grouped together 
as summarized mission requirements. The grouping was a subjective interpretation of the 
researched mission requirements for each program meant to minimize the size of the 
graphic and simplify the figures. These summarized mission requirements are listed in 
red under the “mission requirements” column. If research showed that a program stated a 
mission requirement, an ‘x’ was placed under that program for that mission requirement. 
The “Totals” column indicates the percentage of programs researched that shared the 
same mission requirement. Figure 43 shows the mission requirements matrix for the ISR 
programs that were researched. 
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Figure 43.  Mission Requirements Matrix for ISR Programs 
 
Adapted from: (Citizens in Space 2012; Duffey and Hurley 2005; London 2015; 
USASMDC/ARSTRAT 2015; Wertz, Van Allen, and Barcley 2010). 
As the figure shows, five DOD ISR programs were researched. Across those five 
programs, 21 mission requirements were found. However, only six of the mission 
requirements were shared by more than half of the programs. A similar result was found 
in the researched MILSATCOM programs. Figure 44 shows the mission requirements 
matrix for the MILSATCOM programs that were researched. 
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Figure 44.  Mission Requirements Matrix for MILSATCOM Programs 
 
Adapted from: (Anderson and Raynor 2013; Earth Observation Portal 2015; Jarolimek 2014; 
Mattox 2014; Spaceflight101 2016; Weeks, Marley, and London 2009; Yoo, Obukhov, and 
Mroczek 2015). 
As the figure shows, eight DOD MILSATCOM programs were researched 
compared to five ISR programs. This may suggest one of two things; the DOD has a 
greater need for MILSATCOM small satellites and thus has developed more 
MILSATCOM research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs, or there 
is simply more unclassified documentation of MILSATCOM small satellite programs in 
the public domain compared to ISR small satellite programs. The research produced 16 
summarized mission requirements for MILSATCOM programs. None of the mission 
requirements were shared by all of the researched programs, but eight mission 
requirements were shared by at least half of the programs. 
The data gathered and displayed in these figures provides a quantitative 
foundation for the identification of key factors for DOD small satellites. However, the 
data must be taken with a grain of salt. These mission requirements were gathered from 
unclassified, open source documents. If a news story, report, or specification sheet did 
not specifically list a mission requirement, it was not included, thus some programs 
offered more information than others. An example of this is comparing SNaP-3 and the 
ORS Enabler Satellite (ORSES), for which data offered 14 mission requirements 
compared to one, respectively. Also, as previously mentioned, grouping of specific 
mission requirements into summarized mission requirements was completed with 
subjective interpretation. A different researcher may not group mission requirements the 
same way or may choose to not group mission requirements at all. That subjectivity 
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opens the data and the interpretation of the data to bias, but was necessary for the 




This thesis includes two supplemental files, which can be obtained by contacting 
the Naval Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library. One of the files is a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet, which includes the final version of the trade space analysis worksheet. 
It is one of the decision support tools developed by this thesis based on meta-models 
produced by JMP. Also included in the spreadsheet are the initial user interface 
worksheets that were used to collect user-submitted values for input factors and calculate 
output responses. These initial user interface worksheets provided a foundation for the 
DOE and macro used by the NPS SEEDS Center. T 
JMP data file of the trade space exploration tool also is available as supplemental 
material. The JMP data file includes the 465-point DOE data table created by the NPS 
SEEDS Center, which was used in JMP to perform statistical analysis. JMP provided 
statistical analysis products including the meta-models that were used in the trade space 
analysis worksheet also provided is the JMP contour profiler that is based on the DOE 
data table, which allows graphical exploration of the small satellite trade space.  
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